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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
ROBERT OSORIO TENORIO, : Case No. 20050976-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : Defendant is not incarcerated. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(e)(2005). The Honorable Judge, Denise P. Lindberg, Third District Court, Salt Lake 
County, Utah entered judgment of conviction for Communications Fraud, a second 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 (1999) and Forgery, a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1999) on October 7, 2005. A 
copy of the judgment is in Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW, 
PRESERVATION 
Issue 1: Whether counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel when she 
failed to advise Mr. Tenorio that Forgery is a lesser included offense of Communications 
Fraud and he pled guilty to both Forgery and Communications Fraud and by advising Mr. 
Tenorio to plead guilty to Forgery when the state presented insufficient evidence to prove 
all the elements of Forgery under well established Utah law and whether the ineffective 
representation constitutes exceptional circumstances when same counsel represented Mr. 
Tenorio at plea hearing as at sentencing. 
Standard of Review: Utah courts review ineffective assistance of counsel claims 
raised for the first time on appeal for correctness. State v. Diaz, 2002 UT App 288, f 13, 
55 P.3d 1131. "The exceptional circumstances concept serves as a 'safety device/ to 
assure that 'manifest injustice does not result from the failure to consider an issue on 
appeal.'" State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 8 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). "'[Exceptional 
circumstances' is not so much a precise doctrine, which may be analyzed in terms of 
fixed elements, as it is a descriptive term used to memorialize an appellate court's 
judgment that even though an issue was not raised below . . . unique procedural 
circumstances nonetheless permit consideration of the merits of the issue on appeal." Id. 
Preservation: This is an ineffective assistance of counsel and exceptional 
circumstances claim and so is not preserved. 
Issue 2. Whether the trial court committed plain error by accepting Mr. Tenorio's 
guilty plea without establishing a factual basis for the charges and by failing to personally 
ensure that Mr. Tenorio understood the elements of the charges in relation to the facts in 
violation of rule 11. 
Standard of Review: "To demonstrate plain error, a defendant must establish that 
'(i) an error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the 
error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
outcome for the appellant.' "State v. Larsen, 2005 UT App 201, U 3, 113 P.3d 998 
(quoting State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63,U 15, 95 P.3d 276)(other citations omitted). 
Preservation: This is a plain error claim and so is not preserved. 
Issue 3: Whether current interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(b) which 
precludes review for ineffective assistance of counsel, plain error, and exceptional 
circumstances claims on direct appeal for failure to timely move to withdraw the guilty 
2 
plea violates the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution which guarantees 
the right to counsel and the due process clause of the federal constitution. 
Standard of Review: "Constitutional challenges to statutes present questions of 
law, which [are reviewed] for correctness." State v. Green, 2004 UT 76, ^ j 42, 99 P.3d 
820 (quoting Provo City Corp. v. Thompson, 2004 UT 14, If 5, 86 P.3d 735) (citations 
omitted)). Statutes are presumed constitutional and a party challenging the 
constitutionality of a statute "bear[s] the burden of demonstrating its unconstitutionality." 
Green, 2004 UT 76, ^  42 (quoting Greenwood v. City of N. Salt Lake, 817 P.2d 816, 819 
(Utah 1991)). Moreover, [t]he constitution tolerates a greater degree of vagueness in 
civil statutes than in criminal statutes. Green, 2004 UT 76, &43 (citing Vill. of Hoffman 
Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498-99, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 71 
L.Ed.2d 362 (1982)). 
Preservation: This is an ineffective assistance of counsel, plain error, and 
exceptional circumstances claim and so is not preserved. 
TEXT OF RELEVANT STATUTES 
The text of the following statute is in Addendum B: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 (1999);Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1999); Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-1-303 (1999); Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (1999) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On July 2, 2004, Mr. Tenorio was charged by information with one count of 
Communications Fraud, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-
801 (1999) or in the alternative, Theft by Deception, a second degree felony, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405 (1999) and one count of Forgery, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1999). R.3-8. Trial counsel entered an 
appearance on Mr. Tenorio's behalf on September 14, 2004. R.19. On January 28, 2005, 
Mr. Tenorio entered a not guilty plea for both charges. A preliminary hearing was held 
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on January 6, 2005 and a jury trial was scheduled on April 26, 2005. R.277, 278. On 
April 22, 2005, four days prior to the scheduled trial, Mr. Tenorio changed his plea and 
entered guilty pleas to both counts as charged. R. 161-174; 184-185. Mr. Tenorio, still 
represented by the same trial counsel, never moved to withdraw his guilty plea and was 
sentenced on October 7, 2005. At this sentencing hearing, Mr. Tenorio's trial counsel 
attempted to withdraw as counsel. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The state's evidence 
The evidence presented by the state at the preliminary hearing consists of the 
following: Mr. Tenorio secured a mortgage loan through HUD on January 28, 1999 in 
the amount of $ 83,871.00. R.277: 6-7. Mr. Tenorio defaulted on the loan and HUD, as 
an insurer on the loan, claimed a loss of $50,817.00 after it resold the property minus all 
expenses it expended on the property. Id. at 8. 
The state called as a witness Ray Mudrow, the loan originator from AccuBank 
Mortgage who helped Mr. Tenorio obtain the mortgage loan. Id. at 10-11. Mr. Mudrow 
testified that his duties as a loan originator involve sitting down with the borrower and 
filling out the application, getting a copy of the borrower's "green card, alien card or 
driver's license and social security card." Id. at 11. Mr. Mudrow testified that on the 
loan application the borrower must disclose his or her name and social security number. 
Id. at 14. In addition, the borrower signs the application at closing. Id. During the loan 
process, the mortgage bank also obtains a verification of employment from the 
borrower's employer. Id. at 15. Mr. Mudrow testified that all of these procedures were 
followed when Mr. Tenorio closed on his loan and that Mr. Tenorio provided a copy of 
his social security card. Id. at 17. 
Kevin Shoell, a licensed escrow officer for Title One, testified that he did a closing 
with Mr. Tenorio in relation to this mortgage loan and property on January 28, 1999 in 
Murray, Utah. Id. at 24. Mr. Shoell testified that Mr. Tenorio executed the closing 
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documents in his presence. Id. Mr. Shoell testified that he would have checked Mr. 
Tenorio's identification, such as his driver's license at the time of closing. Id. at 25. In 
addition, Lisa Wodja, a special agent for the Social Security Administration, testified that 
she investigated Mr. Tenorio's Uniform Residential Loan Application. Id. at 31-32. Ms. 
Wodja testified that as part of this investigation she verified that the social security 
number Mr. Tenorio used on the loan application did not belong to him. Id. at 32. She 
testified that the social security number was validly issued, but to another individual who 
was alive when the loan closing took place, but was deceased by the time of the 
preliminary hearing Id. at 32-33. 
Michael Lowder of the Social Security Administration also investigated Mr. 
Tenorio's use of the particular social security number indicated on the loan application 
and testified at the preliminary hearing. Id. at 34. In relation to this, Mr. Lowder 
interviewed Mr. Tenorio about the use of the social security number. Id. at 35. Mr. 
Lowder testified that Mr. Tenorio stated that the social security number was given to him 
by a gentleman on the street in 1996 so that Mr. Tenorio, who is in this country illegally, 
could gain employment. Id. Mr. Lowder testified that Mr. Tenorio admitted that he 
knew using the social security number was wrong. Id. Additionally, Mr. Lowder 
testified that Mr. Tenorio acknowledged signing the loan application. Id. at 36. Mr. 
Tenorio signed his own name to the mortgage loan application and related documentation 
and signed his own name on the social security card. See R. 276: 22 (Trial Court: "Using 
his own name but this fake social security number"); R. 3-8. 
At the preliminary hearing defense counsel argued, among other things that the 
state did not establish a prima facie case of communications fraud because it failed to 
present evidence that Mr, Tenorio devised a scheme or artifice. Id. at 46. The state 
responded by claiming that it had established the communications fraud charge because 
Mr. Tenorio obtained a loan through the scheme or artifice with "the presentment of a 
forged social security card along with the representation that he was in fact a legal citizen 
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and entitled to use that card and number." Id. at 47. The trial court found probable cause 
to bind the case over on the communications fraud count and the forgery count. Id. at 51. 
Trial counsel's representation 
During the course of her representation, defense counsel submitted four motions, 
one of which included a motion for leave to withdraw as counsel. R. 61-64; 65-68; 77-
79, 102-103. Defense counsel formally withdrew two of these motions. R. 104-106; 
107-109. On March 23, 2005, the state responded to defense counsel's motion to 
establish which of alternative charges plaintiff will pursue, concluding: 
The defendant has, without basis in the law, requested that the State be required to 
choose which of alternative charges it will be arguing at trial. The appropriateness 
of the State's action in charging in the alternative is well-established by both 
statute and Utah case law. Moreover, the defendant has not supported his motion 
with any case law or analysis suggesting that charging in the alternative is 
improper. Such a motion, wholly unsupported by either law or analysis, is 
improper and could warrant appropriate sanctions. 
R. 92. In response to defense counsel's motion to establish valuation on March 23, 2005, 
the state concluded: "[t]he defendant's request for additional hearings is unsupported by 
any authority, an abuse of the judicial process, a waste of time and needless presentation 
of cumulative evidence under Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence." R. 96. On 
March 30, 2005, defense counsel submitted a Motion for Leave to Withdraw as Counsel. 
R. 102. On March 31, 2005, defense counsel filed with the court withdrawals of her prior 
motions to establish which of alternative charges plaintiff will pursue and motion to 
establish valuation and of request for hearing. R. 104; 107. 
On April 15, 2005, defense counsel filed a motion in limine to exclude statements 
allegedly made by defendant July 30, 2003; August 7, 2003; June 30, 2004; and July 9, 
2004. R. 131; 149-150. The state responded to this motion on April 21, 2005. R.175-
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177. In its response, the state first argued that the appropriate motion for the defense to 
have brought was a motion to suppress under Rule 12 of Criminal Procedure. R. 175-76. 
Second, the state argued that it was entitled to five days notice in advance of trial for such 
amotion. R. 176. 
Third, it is troubling to observe that the certificate of mailing attached to 
defendant's motion is dated April 15, 2005, and was signed by the attorney for the 
defendant as having been mailed that day. In fact, the envelope addressed to the 
State in which the motion was received, is postmarked April 18, 2005. Even if the 
State had received the motion on the same date it was mailed it would not have 
given the required five days notice. 
R. 176-77. At no time during the course of her representation did counsel challenge the 
propriety of the forgery charge or argue that forgery could be a lesser included offense to 
the charge of communications fraud under Utah law to the trial court. R. 276:1-37. Nor 
did trial counsel ever advise Mr. Tenorio of such possibilities under Utah law. Instead, 
counsel focused on issues irrelevant to the charges her client was facing. For instance, at 
the change of plea hearing, counsel articulated to the trial court: 
Were we to argue this, we would argue that he lacked the intent to cause this and 
did not intentionally default on the house. He lived there for years and made 
various improvements. It happened to many people unfortunately, could not -
Trial Court: The issue is not that he intended to default on the house. The issue is 
that he intended to and in fact did use information that didn't belong to him to 
secure a loan in which he then was unable to maintain, right? 
R.276:22-23. 
The plea colloquy 
On April 22, 2005, just four days before trial, Mr. Tenorio changed his plea from 
not guilty to guilty to all counts as charged. R. 276:19-31. The state explained the terms 
of the plea agreement to the trial court and the trial court attempted to sort through the 
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facts of the case. Id. at 22. The state explained to the court that Mr. Tenorio was using a 
social security card that legally belonged to another person he had purchased off of the 
street after arriving to America. Id. The trial court specifically commented: "[ujsing his 
own name but this fake social security number, this other person's, deceased person's 
social security number." Id. The state explained that Mr. Tenorio used the "forged social 
security card" to obtain a HUD guaranteed loan for a house which he subsequently 
defaulted on. Id. 
Defense counsel argued on behalf of Mr. Tenorio the following: 
Defense:. . . I have advised him of the consequences of coming back to this country after 
deportation is fatal. Not only would he be forced to serve out whatever sentence he 
would have remaining on these charges but then of course he would be in serious trouble 
with the United States and would face consequences separate from these charges here. 
He's been in this country, working hard, does not have a criminal record. He basically is 
here working and lacked the intent to defraud. He was a— 
Trial Court: Well, if he lacked the intent to defraud, whey are we pleading? Why aren't 
we going to trial on Tuesday and he has the right to a speedy trial with an impartial jury 
and let the matter be a matter of proof for the State. 
Defense: Well, that is true. Forgive me Your Honor, are you asking me to—I know that 
my client if he pleads guilty needs to make a statement to the Court about what he is 
pleading guilty to. 
Trial Court: Correct. 
Defense: We can do that. 
Id. at 23-24. The trial court then addressed Mr. Tenorio: 
Trial Court: Mr. Osorio, do you understand that you are set for trial this coming Tuesday 
and you would have the right to a speedy trial with an impartial jury? You would have 
the right at trial to be represented by counsel. It would be the State's burden to prove you 
guilty of these charges beyond a reasonable doubt and you would be presumed innocent 
and the jury would be instructed that they must begin the trial with that presumption. 
At trial, you would have the right to confront and cross examine witnesses against you, 
subpoena your own witnesses to appear and testify and if a jury convicted you, you 
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would have a right to appeal. Now, by entering this plea, you would be giving up many 
of those rights most of those rights and you would be severely limiting your appeal rights. 
Now those rights are explained in more detail in that yellow document that your attorney 
has there that is written in both English and Spanish. Did you have a chance to read it 
over or review it with your attorney? Senior Osorio?1 
Mr. Tenorio expressed hesitance in pleading guilty and so the trial court allowed 
for Mr. Tenorio to review the plea affidavit. After the brief recess, Mr. Tenorio pled 
guilty to both counts as charged. 
In accepting the guilty plea, the trial court explained the charges as following: 
By your plea - and let me just get to the information here - by your plea, you 
would be admitting that beginning on or about January of 1999 in Salt Lake 
County you devised a scheme to defraud AccuBank Mortgage Corporation and the 
Federal Housing Administration or to obtain from them money, property, or 
anything else of value by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, 
promises, or material omissions. And you communicated directly or indirectly 
with other people in order to execute or conceal the scheme. What's more, in 
connection with the scheme, you obtained property that was worth more than $ 
5,000. 
You're also admitting that on or about January 1999 in Salt Lake County, with a 
purpose to defraud or understanding and knowledge that you were facilitating a 
fraud, you made or uttered a writing that purported to be the act of somebody 
else3. 
Id. at 27. 
The state explained its evidence as following: 
1
 The Trial Court frequently referred to Mr. Robert Osorio Tenorio as Mr. Osorio. For 
ease and to avoid confusion appellate counsel uses the party name Tenorio throughout 
this appeal. 
2
 The Plea Affidavit is attached as Addendum C; The plea affidavit does not list the 
elements of forgery or communications fraud, nor do the facts ever relate to those 
specific elements. 
3
 The entire plea colloquy is not represented in these facts, but the relevant portions to this 
appeal. However, the full transcript will be added as addendum for this Court to review 
thoroughly. 
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What the State's evidence would have shown is that in 1999 the defendant 
presented a forged social security card, one that had not been issued to him with a 
fake number on it in order to obtain a loan. He presented that to a mortgage loan 
officer essentially with the representation that he was here legally by presenting 
that card. Relying upon that representation, the mortgage loan officer then 
prepared a loan packet for him and submitted that. The loan packet included that 
social security number within it and the defendant signed indicating it was indeed 
his social security number. That loan went through the process for approximately 
two months during which the defendant provided additional information like 
where he worked. That information also contained the social security number on 
it. At the end of that period if [sic] then went to a closing where again the 
defendant represented that that was his social security number and the loan was 
closed. The mortgage officer nor the title officer would have proceeded with any 
of it if they had known that that wasn't his social security number and the loan 
would not have closed. The loan was closed, he received a loan in the amount of $ 
80,000 some odd which was HUD guaranteed. He paid on the loan for a period of 
time, I think it was approximately two years, I'm not positive. At that time the 
loan went into default and the house was foreclosed and HUD honored their 
guaranteed [sic] and paid out approximately $ 50,000 some odd which we have 
specified the exact amount in the plea agreement. That would be the State's 
evidence. 
Id. at 28-29. The trial court commented: "[a]ll right. Those facts support the plea that 
has been entered." Id. at 29. 
Based on the guilty plea, on July, 22, 2005 the trial court sentenced Mr. Tenorio to 
a term of 365 days for the communications fraud conviction and to a term of 365 days for 
the forgery conviction, with the total time suspended. R. 198. In addition, the trial court 
ordered restitution in the amount of $ 50, 817.00 plus interest to be paid in behalf of 
HUD. Id. On October 7, 2005, on the state's motion to correct the sentence, the trial 
court altered its prior sentence to reflect suspended terms of zero to five years in the Utah 
State Prison for the third degree forgery conviction and one to fifteen years in the Utah 
State Prison for the second degree communications fraud conviction. R.200-201. 
Defense counsel opposed such motion based on the oral announcement of the sentence on 
July 22, 2005. R. 223. On October 7, 2005 the trial court pronounced sentence as an 
indeterminate term of one to fifteen years at Utah State Prison for the communications 
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fraud conviction and zero to five years at the Utah State Prison for the forgery conviction, 
with both terms suspended on condition of one year probation which would be stayed if 
Mr. Tenorio surrendered to ICE. R. 276:39. 
The trial court altered the sentence on its own motion, welcoming the defendant to 
take the issue up on appeal. Id. At this time, defense counsel requested to withdraw as 
counsel. Id. The trial court stated: "[a]t this point I'm not prepared to entertain any 
Motion to Withdraw until the 30-day appeal period has run. You can discuss with your 
client whether or not an appeal is warranted, what the chances of success on an appeal 
are, explore with him what his views are about that but I'm not going to leave him 
unrepresented at the last minute until he has full opportunity to decide what he's going to 
do with the Court's judgment." Id. at 39-40. Defendant had the same counsel at the 
change of plea hearing as he did at sentencing and did not move to withdraw his guilty 
plea during this time frame. Defendant filed an Affidavit of Indigency on October 18, 
2005. R. 255-258. Based on the trial court's order appointing counsel, appellate counsel 
entered appearance on November 1, 2006. This appeal follows. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Mr. Tenorio can show on the face of the record ineffective assistance of counsel, 
exceptional circumstances, and that the trial court committed plain error. This Court 
should allow for direct appellate review to cure constitutional defects, to avoid manifest 
injustice, and to comport with the demands of due process. 
The current state of the law in Utah regarding the right to appeal a guilty plea that 
was rendered on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel is constitutionally 
inadequate. When a defendant does not have the legal savvy, nor the effective assistance 
of counsel, to move to withdraw an invalid guilty plea before sentencing, it leaves such 
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defendants without the constitutionally demanded appeal of right, the assistance of 
effective counsel for trial and direct appeal, and leaves this Court without jurisdiction to 
remedy such constitutional defects. 
Other areas of the law allow for this Court to hear an ineffective assistance claim 
even if it wasn't properly preserved below based on the rare procedural anomaly that 
often times a defendant who receives ineffective assistance is with that same ineffective 
counsel throughout all legal proceedings where such claims can be remedied. This Court 
has recognized that a defendant cannot be responsible to preserve such claims because it 
is not likely that incompetent counsel will advise the defendant of such defects. For 
defendants who are rendered ineffective assistance of counsel at a plea hearing in which 
they plead guilty throughout sentencing, the same policy should apply and the same 
protections are needed. 
While current statutory interpretation does not allow this Court jurisdiction to 
remedy these constitutionally defective pleas, the constitutions of the United States and 
Utah demand such a policy to protect the constitutional right of all defendants to the 
effective assistance of counsel and right to a full and fair appeal. It is not enough that a 
defendant can pursue a withdrawal of his or her guilty plea in post-conviction 
proceedings because such defendants have been denied the constitutional right to 
effective assistance of counsel throughout all critical stages of their case in such a manner 
that ultimately deprives them of the right to remedy such defects in direct appeal aided by 
the effective assistance of counsel. 
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The Utah Supreme Court decision State v. Reyes. 2002 UT 13, 40 P.3d 630 did 
not directly hold that a defendant on direct appeal from a criminal conviction could not 
claim ineffective assistance or argue plain error in taking the plea. To the extent Reyes 
and other supreme court cases have been read as precluding plain error or ineffective 
assistance claims when a defendant has not timely moved to withdraw a guilty plea, such 
decisions depart from established case law that protect these constitutional rights. 
Current interpretation of Reyes allows for constitutional violations and, as such, this 
Court is empowered to interpret the withdrawal statute in accordance with the demands 
of the United States and Utah Constitution. Moreover, this Court should overturn case 
law from this Court that obliterates review for plain error, ineffective assistance, and 
exceptional circumstances for timely direct appeals of the guilty plea conviction in order 
to comport with constitutional requirements. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE ON THE FACE OF THE 
RECORD WHEN SHE ADVISED MR. TENORIO TO PLEAD TO THE FORGERY 
AND COMMUNICATION COUNTS AS CHARGED AND THE SAME 
INEFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION FROM THE GUILTY PLEA TO SENTENCING 
IS A RARE PROCEDURAL ANOMALY QUALIFYING AS EXCEPTIONAL 
CIRCUMSTANCES. 
Utah courts apply the Strickland test to challenges to guilty pleas based on 
ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Martinez, 2001 UT 12, ^ [16, 26 P.3d 203 (citing 
Hill v. Lockhart 474 U.S. 52, 58, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985)).The Supreme 
Court held in McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, n. 14, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 1449 n. 14, 25 
L.Ed.2d 763 (1970), that the guarantee to the assistance of counsel in the Sixth 
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amendment would be hollow if defendants were "left to the mercies of incompetent 
counsel." Id. The two -pronged effectiveness test announced in Strickland v. 
Washington, was derived from this principle. 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 S.Ct 2052, 80 
L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Under Strickland, "an individual has been denied effective 
assistance of counsel if: (1) counsel's performance was deficient below an objective 
standard of reasonable professional judgment, and (2) counsel's performance prejudiced 
the defendant." Martinez, 2001 UT 12, If 16 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88). 
More specifically "[w]here a defendant challenges a guilty plea on grounds of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, he or she must show a 'reasonable probability that, but 
for counsel's errors, he [or she] would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted 
on going to trial." State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, ^  22 (quoting Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 
516, 525 (Utah 1994)). Therefore, "counsel's deficient performance must have affected 
the outcome of the plea process." Id. (citation omitted). "In determining whether 
counsel's performance was deficient, [Utah courts] . . . 'presume that counsel has 
rendered adequate assistance. . . . Thus, if the challenged act or omission might be 
considered sound trial strategy, we will not find that it demonstrates inadequacy of 
counsel.'" Id. Moreover, "exceptional circumstances . . . serves as a 'safety device,' to 
assure that 'manifest injustice does not result from the failure to consider an issue on 
appeal.'" State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 8 (Utah Ct. App. 1996)(citation omitted). 
'"[Exceptional circumstances' is not so much a precise doctrine, which may be analyzed 
in terms of fixed elements, as it is a descriptive term used to memorialize an appellate 
court's judgment that even though an issue was not raised below and even though the 
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plain error doctrine does not apply, unique procedural circumstances nonetheless permit 
consideration of the merits of the issue on appeal. Id. This exception applies to these 
claims because Mr. Tenorio was represented by the same ineffective counsel at the plea 
hearing who rendered ineffective advice concerning the charges and plea as he was at 
sentencing. In order for these issues to have been preserved, and in order for Mr. Tenorio 
to comply with Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 his counsel would have had to have moved to 
withdraw the guilty plea based on her own ineffective assistance of counsel. 
A. MR. TENORIO'S TRIAL COUNSEL'S SPECIFIC ACTS OR OMISSIONS 
FELL BELOW THE STANDARD OF REASONABLE PROFESSIONAL 
ASSISTANCE WHEN SHE DID NOT ARGUE NOR ADVISE THE CLIENT 
THE STATE HAD INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH A 
FORGERY CONVICTION. 
Trial counsel was ineffective when she failed to reasonably investigate the law of 
forgery in Utah and advised Mr. Tenorio to plead to both counts as charged even though 
the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing and outlined at the plea hearing did not 
support all of the elements of forgery. Mr. Tenorio was prejudiced by accepting 
counsel's ineffective legal advice and pleading guilty to both counts as charged. In order 
to establish a forgery charge, the state was required to prove: 
(1) A person us guilty of forgery, if with purpose to defraud anyone, or with 
knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he: 
(a) alters any writing of another without his authority or utters any such altered 
writing; or 
(b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, transfers, publishes, or 
utters any writing so that the writing or the making, completion, execution, 
authentication, issuance, transference, publication or utterance purports to 
be the act of another, whether the person is existent or nonexistent, or 
purports to have been executed at a time or place or in a numbered 
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sequence other than was in fact the case, or to be a copy of an original when 
so such original existed. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501(1999)(emphasis added). In addition, Utah case law 
construing this statute, establishes that one cannot be convicted of forgery if he or she 
signs the relevant document with his or her own name and is not purporting to be another 
person with the same name. See State v. Jensen, 2004 UT App 467, ^ 15, 105 P.3d 951. 
Mr. Tenorio's trial counsel failed to gain knowledge of the law of the specific crimes 
of which her client was charged. Clients are entitled to competent legal advice during the 
pretrial proceedings, including during plea negotiations. Lockhart 474 U.S. 52 (1985); 
Martinez, 2001 UT 12; Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516 (Utah 1994). The United States 
Supreme Court has stated that: 
Where, as here, a defendant is represented by counsel during the plea process and 
enters his plea upon the advice of counsel, the voluntariness of the plea depends 
on whether counsel's advice "was within the range of competence demanded of 
attorneys in criminal cases." 
Lockhart 474 U.S. at 56 (citations omitted). "Knowledge of the law is a basic 
prerequisite to providing competent legal assistance. If an attorney does not investigate 
clearly relevant law, then he or she has objectively failed to provide effective assistance." 
State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (citing State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638, 
645-46 (Utah 1996)). 
Moreover, the American Bar Association's ethical standards on the "Defense 
Function" provide that: 
after informing himself fully on the facts in the law, defense counsel should advise 
the accused with complete candor concerning all aspects of the case, including his 
candid estimate of the probable outcome, and that it is unprofessional conduct for 
16 
a lawyer to understate or overstate the risks, hazards, or prospects of the case in 
order to exert undue influence on the defendant's decision with regard to pleading. 
ABA Standards, The Defense Function § 5.1(a,b). Also section 6.1 states: 
that when the attorney concludes on the basis of full investigation and study that 
under the controlling law and the evidence of a conviction is probable, he should 
so advise the defendant and seek his consent to engage in plea discussions with the 
prosecutor, if such course appears desirable. 
Finally, the ABA Standards, "Pleas of Guilty," § 3.2(b), provides that in order to aid the 
accused in reaching a decision, defense counsel, after appropriate investigation, should 
advise him of the available alternatives and of the considerations deemed important by 
counsel or the accused in reaching a decision. 
Thus, Utah law and the ABA standards require that in order to render effective 
assistance, counsel must gain adequate knowledge of the crimes of which her client is 
being charged. The record reveals that Mr. Tenorio's trial counsel did not gain necessary 
knowledge of the required elements of forgery in order to effectively assist her client. 
Utah courts will not assume, outside the record, that attorneys have fully advised their 
clients of such inadequacies: "[t]he law will not assume that counsel has advised his 
client of his inadequacies or those of his associates." State v. Smith, 621 P.2d 697, 699 
(Utah 1980). 
This Court "has emphasized that in forgery prosecutions the State must prove that 
the defendant used the name of another." State v. Jensen, 2004 UT App 467, If 11; 105 
P.3d 951 (citing State v. Gonzalez, 822 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)('"The 
state must show that the defendant not only used the name of another, but must also show 
that [she] did so without any authority to do so.'"). Mr. Tenorio signed his own name on 
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all relevant documentation in this case. The state failed to demonstrate even one instance 
where Mr. Tenorio used the name of another or that Mr. Tenorio was purporting to be 
another with the same name. Defense counsel did not make one argument concerning the 
evidence the state presented to establish the forgery charge. In this case a reasonable 
investigation would have alerted counsel that her client was facing an erroneous charge 
of which the state had insufficient evidence to prove. 
The fact that Mr. Tenorio used a social security number that he had no authority to 
use does not render his action of signing his own name to the card and loan 
documentation a forgery. Accord Jensen, 2004 UT App 467 at ^ 10-15. In Jensen, the 
defendant signed his own name on a deed for a company of which he had no authority to 
sign in that capacity. Id. at ^14. The defendant was charged with forgery and fraudulent 
handling of records and after a jury trial was convicted of both charges. Id. at ^ 5. The 
evidence the state presented to the jury to establish the forgery charge was that the 
defendant signed his true name on a deed in a capacity of which he had no authority. Id. 
at If 4. 
This Court reversed the forgery charge stating "'it is well established that forgery 
contemplates a writing which falsely purports to be the writing of another person than the 
actual maker.5" Id. at Tf 11 (quoting Greathouse v. United States, 170 F.2d 512, 514 (4th 
Cir. 1948)). This Court stated that the defendant "signed his own name to the Deed on 
the line reserved for BE and added the words 'see lease.5 Consequently, [the defendant] 
did not make an instrument purporting to be the act of another." Id. at f^ 15. 
Accordingly, this Court reversed the forgery conviction. Id. Likewise, in this case, Mr. 
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Tenorio signed his own true name to the social security card and to the loan 
documentation. While Mr. Tenorio did not have the authority or right to use the social 
security number, that does not render his action a forgery. Thus, the guilty plea and 
resulting forgery conviction in this case prejudiced Mr. Tenorio. 
Additionally, in Jensen this Court cited to other jurisdictions with statutes similar 
to the Utah statute that have held that when a defendant signs his or her own true name to 
a document, even if it is in a fraudulent capacity, that signature does not support a charge 
of forgery. For instance in Nobles v. Marcus, 533 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. 1976), the Texas 
Court of Appeals held that "one who signs his true name, and does not represent himself 
to be someone else of the same name, does not commit a forgery because his act does not 
purport to be that of another." Id. at 926. The court stated that while the defendant "may 
[have been] guilty of falsely representing the power under which he executed the 
instrument... he did not represent his act to be that of another. Id. 
Likewise, in People v. Mann. 75 N.Y.484, 486 (N.Y. 1878), the New York Court 
of Appeals distinguished purporting to be the act of another, a required element for 
forgery, from the false assumption of authority: 
One who makes an instrument signed with his own name, but purporting to bind 
another, does not make an instrument purporting to be the act of another . . . The 
instrument shows upon its face that it is made by himself and is in point of fact his 
own act. The wrong done . . . consists in the false assumption of authority to bind 
another... 
Id. at 486-87. The New York Court of Appeals has also recently supported this 
proposition of law when it held "it is not forgery for a person to sign his own name to an 
instrument, and falsely and fraudulently represent that he has authority to bind another by 
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doing so"; "the signer is guilty of false pretenses only." People v. Cunningham, 813 
N.E.2d 891, 893 (N.Y. 2004). The court further stated "under our present Penal law, as 
under prior statutes and the common law, a distinction must be drawn between an 
instrument which is falsely made, altered or completed, and an instrument which contains 
misrepresentations not relevant to the identity of the maker or drawer of the instrument." 
Id. at 893. 
Not only is it Utah law that when a defendant signs his own true name to a 
document it is not forgery, it is the long standing rule. See Commonwealth v. Baldwin, 
77 Mass. 197, 198 (Mass. 1858)("As a general rule however, to constitute forgery, the 
writing falsely made must purport to be the writing of another party than the person 
making it."); State v. Young, 46 N.H. 266 (N.H. 1865)("For Lord Coke in his Institutes 
says, as we have before seen, that forgery 'is properly taken where the act is done in the 
name ofanother person. '"(emphasis in original)); Commonwealth v. Apalakis, 396 Mass. 
292, 297 n.6 (Mass. 1985)("forgery is committed either by falsely creating or making a 
legal instrument or by materially altering it with the intent to deceive. The writing itself 
must be false and hence a writing which is otherwise genuine but which contains false 
statements made with intent to deceive is not a forgery because the instrument itself is not 
false, but rather the statements therein. Accordingly, not every fraudulent instrument is a 
forgery."(quoting J.R. Nolan, Criminal Law § 382, 224 (1976)(emphasis in original)); 
People v. Cunningham, 813 N.E.2d 891 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2004)(same); People v. Mann, 
75 N.Y. 484 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1878)(same); Lusitania Savings Bank, FSB v. Progressive 
Casualty Insurance Company, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 13331 (3rd Cir. 
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2005)(memorandum decision)(same); State v. Lamb, 152 S.E. 154,155 (N.C. 1930)("It 
would be difficult to frame a definition to include all possible cases; but as a rule the false 
writing must purport to be the writing of a party other than the one who makes it and it 
must indicate an attempted deception of similarity."); Reese v. State, 378 A.2d 4, 7 (Md. 
Ct. Spec. App. 1977)("It is forgery to sign another man's name to a note, without 
authority and with intent to defraud . . . but it is not forgery for a person to sign his own 
name to an instrument, and falsely and fraudulently represent that he has authority to bind 
another . . . " ) ; State v. Taylor, 16 So. 190 (La. 1894)(Same); Charter Bank Northwest v. 
Evanston Insurance Company, 791 F.2d 379, 381 (5th Cir. 1986)("one who signs his own 
true name does not commit forger, even where acting as an agent without actual 
authority: 'while the alleged agent may be culpable for his fraud he has not committed a 
forgery.'"); Graham v. State, 51 S.W.2d 369 (Tex. Crim. App. 1932)(same); State v. 
Ferguson, 234 N.E.2d 598 (Ohio Ct. App. 1967)(same); Bank of Detroit v. Standard 
Accident Insurance Co., 222 N.W. 134, 135 (Mich. 1928)("The law, as we have seen, is 
well settled that if a person sign an instrument with his own name per procuration of the 
party whom he intends or pretends to represent, it is no forgery, it is no false making of 
the instrument, but merely a false assumption of authority."(emphasis in original)); State 
v. Schoelerman,315 N.W. 2d 67 (Iowa 1982)(same); State v. Blake, 760 P.2d 1369 (Ore. 
Ct.App. 1988)(same). 
Trial counsel never moved to have the forgery charge dismissed for lack of 
sufficient evidence, never argued to the trial court concerning the validity of the forgery 
charge, and never advised Mr. Tenorio that the state's evidence was lacking in order to 
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support a forgery charge. Yet trial counsel represented Mr. Tenorio from September 14, 
2004 until October 18, 2005. R.19. This Court issued its Jensen decision, clearly on 
point, on December 16, 2004. See Jensen, 2004 UT App 467. Mr. Tenorio pled guilty to 
this charge on April 22, 2005, just four days before his scheduled jury trial and more than 
four months after Jensen was issued. Even more egregious is the fact that earlier 
language in Utah cases and the long standing rule in a majority of jurisdictions hold that 
one cannot be guilty of a forgery when they sign their own true name to documentation. 
See State v.Gonzalez, 822 P.2d 1214 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Accordingly, trial counsel's 
lack of knowledge of the law of forgery fell below the standard of reasonable 
professional assistance. Accord Ross, 951 P.2d at 246 ("Knowledge of the law is a basic 
prerequisite to providing competent legal assistance. If an attorney does not investigate 
clearly relevant law, then he or she has objectively failed to provide effective 
assistance."(titations omitted)). In order to demonstrate prejudice for ineffective advice 
on a guilty plea, Mr. Tenorio must demonstrate that he would not have pled guilty but for 
the error. Dean, 2004 UT 63, % 22. In this case, it was factually impossible that Mr. 
Tenorio committed forgery, yet based on his attorney's advice he pled guilty as charged 
to the forgery count and was accordingly prejudiced. 
B. DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE IN ADVISING DEFENDANT 
TO PLEAD GUILTY TO BOTH COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD AND 
FORGERY WHEN FORGERY IS A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE. 
Defense counsel was ineffective for failing to advise Mr. Tenorio in regards to the 
plea agreement, that under the circumstances of his case, the forgery charge was a lesser 
included offense to communications fraud and the state could not have lawfully convicted 
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Mr. Tenorio of both counts. Under the state's theory and evidence of this case, forgery 
was a lesser included offense of communications fraud.4 Utah Code Annotated §76-1-
402(1) provides that: 
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all separate offenses 
arising out of a single criminal episode; however, when the same act of a defendant under 
a single criminal episode shall establish offenses which may be punished in different 
ways under different provisions of this code, the act shall be punishable under only one 
such provision; an acquittal or conviction and sentence under any such provision bars a 
prosecution under any other such provision. 
Id. Case law has interpreted that "[t]he prohibition on conviction for lesser-included 
offenses flows from the double jeopardy clauses of the Utah and the United States 
Constitutions." Ross, 952 P.2d at 241. See Utah Const, art. I, § 12 ("Nor shall any 
person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.5'); U.S. Const, amend. V ("Nor shall 
any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."). 
Utah courts employ a two-pronged analysis in order to identify lesser-included 
offenses. See Ross, 952 P.2d at 241; State v. Hill 674 P.2d 96 (Utah 1983); State v. 
Knight 2003 UT App 354, If 9, 79 P.3d 969; State v. Pierson, 2000 UT App 274, If 12, 12 
P.3d 103; State v. Smith, 2005 UT 57, If 9, 122 P.3d 615; State v. Finlayson, 2000 UT 10, 
f16, 994 P.2d 1243, First, Utah courts will determine whether the lesser included 
offense is "established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish 
4
 Additionally, counsel was ineffective for advising Mr. Tenorio to plead as charged to 
the communications fraud count when there was a facial validity challenge to the 
communications fraud statute for vagueness at the time of the plea hearing. See State v. 
Norns, Case No. 20040880-SC; State v. Norris, Case No. 20041118-SC. Failure to 
advise Mr. Tenorio that there was a constitutional challenge prejudice Appellant since he 
pled guilty as charged to both counts despite a question as to the constitutional validity of 
the communications fraud statute. 
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the commission of the offense charged." Hill, 674 P.2d at 97. "If the two crimes are 
'such that the greater cannot be committed without necessarily having committed the 
lesser/ then the lesser offense 'merges into the greater crime and the state cannot convict 
and punish the defendant for both offenses."5 Ross, 951 P.2d at 241. While in most 
cases this determination can be affected by comparing the statutory elements of both 
crimes, in cases where the two crimes have "multiple variations, [Utah courts] look 
beyond the statutory elements and 'consider the evidence to determine whether the 
greater-lesser relationship exists. '" Id. 
To establish communications fraud, the state was required to prove the following: 
(1) Any person who has devised any scheme or artifice to defraud another or to obtain 
from another money, property, or anything of value by means of false or fraudulent 
pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who communicates 
directly or indirectly with any person by any means for the purpose of executing or 
concealing the scheme or artifice is guilty of: 
(d) a second degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing 
obtained or sought to be obtained is or exceeds $5,000. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1999). 
To establish forgery, the state was required to prove the following: 
(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud anyone, or with 
knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he: 
(a) alters any writing of another without his authority or utters any such altered 
writing; or 
(b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, transfers, publishes, or 
utters any writing so that the writing or the making, completion, execution, 
authentication, issuance, transference, publication or utterance purports to 
be the act of another, whether the person is existent or nonexistent, or 
purports to have been executed at a time or place or in a numbered 
sequence other than was in fact the case, or to be a copy of an original when 
no such original existed. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1999). 
This Court noted in Ross that "some variations of communications fraud clearly 
include forgery." Ross, 951 P.2d at 242. In Ross the state presented evidence that 
showed that the defendant was involved in a check cashing scheme in which the 
defendant and a man identified as "Nikki" would pick up a female accomplice and hand 
her a forged check. Id. at 237. They would drive to a store and then the female would 
cash the forged check and then the three would split the proceeds. Id. This Court held 
that on these facts "element one of the third degree forgery is clearly included in element 
one of second degree communications fraud; once the jury had found that defendant had 
'devised a scheme to defraud,' it could not avoid finding that defendant had 'knowledge 
that he was facilitating a fraud.'" Id. at 242. 
Likewise, in this case, the state explained its evidence to prove the counts of 
forgery and communications fraud as following: 
What the State's evidence would have shown is that in 1999 the defendant 
presented a forged social security card, one that had not been issued to him with a 
fake number on it in order to obtain a loan. He presented that to a mortgage loan 
officer essentially with the representation that he was here legally by presenting 
that card. Relying upon that representation, the mortgage loan officer then 
prepared a loan packet for him and submitted that. 
R.276: 28-29. (emphasis added). Additionally, the plea affidavit states: 
I presented a forged social security card to a mortgage lender and represented that 
number belonged to me to obtain a HUD guaranteed loan in the amount of 83,871 
to purchase a house. The above events occurredon January 28, 1998, in SL County 
Utah. 
R. 163. Thus, just like in Ross, in this case the state attempted to prove that "element one 
of the third degree forgery is clearly included in element one of second degree 
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communications fraud;" once the state attempted to establish that the defendant had 
"devised a scheme to defraud," it also attempted to establish, through the same proof, that 
defendant had "knowledge that he was facilitating a fraud/" Id. at 242. The state 
attempted to prove the scheme to defraud and the knowledge that Mr. Tenorio was 
facilitating a fraud by showing that Mr. Tenorio obtained a false social security card. 
Moreover, the social security card itself, with Mr. Tenorio5s signature, is the alleged 
forged writing and that very same card is the fraudulent representation in order to 
establish the communications fraud charge. 
Indeed the facts of this case are similar to the variation this Court articulated in 
Ross that demonstrates forgery can be a lesser included offense to communications fraud. 
This Court stated: 
the State might prove a defendant committed communications fraud by showing 
that: (1) a defendant devised a scheme to defraud that involved passing forged 
checks; (2) the defendant communicated with another person for the purpose of 
executing the scheme by uttering or transferring a forged check worth at least 
$100, and; (3) the forgery, which requires only that a defendant knowingly utter a 
forged check worth over $100, would be established by 'proof of the same or less 
than all the facts" required to prove second degree communications fraud. 
Id. at 242. In this case, the state attempted to prove (1) that Mr. Tenorio devised a 
scheme to defraud by obtaining and signing a social security card with a number that was 
issued to another individual; (2) that Mr. Tenorio communicated with another person for 
the purpose of executing the scheme by presenting the signed social security card to 
AccuBank Mortgage in order to obtain a loan, and (3) the "forged" social security card 
would be established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to prove 
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communications fraud. Consequently, like in Ross, in this case, Mr. Tenorio's forgery 
conviction was a lesser included offense to his communications fraud conviction. 
Mr. Tenorio's trial counsel was ineffective when she did not inform Mr. Tenorio 
that the alleged forgery was a lesser included offense under the facts of this case. 
"Knowledge of the law is a basic prerequisite to providing competent legal assistance. If 
an attorney does not investigate clearly relevant law, then he or she has objectively failed 
to provide effective assistance of counsel." Ross, 951 P.2d at 246 (citations omitted). As 
demonstrated supra at Point 1(a), trial counsel neither moved the trial court for dismissal 
of the forgery count as it was a lesser included offense of communications fraud, nor 
advised Mr. Tenorio of such when advising him of the plea. Just like in Ross, in this case 
a reasonable investigation would have alerted counsel that her client might be facing 
double jeopardy. See id. The same rationale this Court employed in Ross is directly 
applicable to this case: 
First, section 76-1-402(3)(a) states that a crime is a lesser-included offense when 
"it is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish 
the commission of the greater offense." Second, Hill clearly established that when 
crimes have multiple variations, some variations may be lesser-included offenses. 
See Hill, 674 P.2d at 98. Third, Bradley laid out a test under which defendant's 
forgery charges were lesser-included offenses on the facts the State presented at 
trial. See State v. Bradley, 752 P.2d 874 (Utah 1985) at 878. Fourth, the State in 
this case consistently argued a theory of defendant's crime in which the forgery 
counts were proven by fewer than all the elements required to prove 
communications fraud. 
Id. Even more compelling, is the fact that Ross, a case directly on point to this case, was 
issued from this Court on December 26, 1997, nearly seven and a half years prior to Mr. 
Tenorio entering his guilty plea on April 22, 2005. See Ross, 951 P.2d 236. This Court 
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found that a similar error by counsel in Ross "fell below an objective standard of 
reasonable professional competence" and Mr. Tenorio respectfully requests that this 
Court so find in this case. Ross, 951 P.2d at 246. 
"When a defendant has been improperly convicted of both a greater and a lesser 
offense, it is appropriate to regard the conviction of the lesser offense as mere surplusage, 
which does not invalidate the conviction and sentence on the greater offense." Id. 
(quoting Hill 674 P.2d at 98.). Likewise, Mr. Tenorio respectfully requests that this 
Court reverse his forgery conviction. Because Mr. Tenorio pled to both counts as 
charged on advice of ineffective counsel and was not advised by counsel that Utah law 
supported that his charges included a lesser included offense, he was prejudiced. See 
Dean, 2004 UT 63,^22. 
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR BY ACCEPTING 
THE GUILTY PLEA TO FORGERY WHEN THE FACTS OUTLINED AT THE PLEA 
HEARING DID NOT SUPPORT ALL THE ELEMENTS OF A FORGERY CHARGE 
AND THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT PERSONALLY ENSURE THAT MR. 
TENORIO UNDERSTOOD THE FACTS OF HIS CASE IN RELATION TO THE 
ELEMENTS OF THE CHARGES. 
The trial court committed plain error when accepting the guilty plea for the 
forgery charge contravening Rule 11 because there was not a factual basis for forgery and 
the trial court did not personally ensure on the record that Mr. Tenorio understood the 
nature of the elements of forgery in relation to the facts of this case. Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, Rule 11 states in relevant part: 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill, 
and may not accept the plea until the court has found: 
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(e)(4)(A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to which the 
plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the burden of proving each of 
those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the plea is an admission of all those 
elements; 
(e)(4)(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it establishes 
that the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant or, if the defendant 
refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the prosecution has sufficient 
evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction; 
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record or, if used, a 
written statement reciting these factors after the court has established that the defendant 
has read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of the statement. If the defendant 
cannot understand the English language, it will be sufficient that the statement has been 
read or translated to the defendant. 
Utah R. Crim. P. Rule 11(2005). 
This Court has stated in reference to the mandates of Rule 11: "there are situations 
in which a trial court must refuse a defendant's guilty plea because it is duty-bound to 
protect a criminal defendant's constitutional rights," State v. Lopez, 2005 UT App 496, K 
22, 128 P.3d 1. "The trial court has an important role to play in assessing the 
appropriateness of a proffered plea agreement....'" State v. Montiel 2005 UT 48, «[f 14, 
122 P.3d 571. "The purpose of rule 11 is to ensure that defendants know their rights and 
understand the basic consequences of their decision to plead guilty." State v. Dean, 2004 
UT63,^9,95P.3d276. 
Utah Courts have "described the trial court's duty in this regard as a duty of 'strict 
compliance,' [and] have also declared that strict compliance 'does not mandate a 
particular script or rote recitation of the rights listed.1" Id. In addition, "[p]lea affidavits 
or plea statements are properly used and incorporated into the record when the trial court 
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determines that the defendant has read the affidavit or statement, understands its contents, 
and acknowledges those contents." Id. 
Nevertheless, the strict compliance standard requires that the trial court 
"personally establish that the defendant's guilty plea is truly knowing and voluntary and 
establish on the record that the defendant knowingly waived his or her constitutional 
rights and understood the elements of the crime." State v. Thurman, 911 P.2d 371, 372 
(Utah 1996). "It is not sufficient to assume that defense attorneys make their clients fully 
understand the contents of the affidavit." State v. Pharris, 798 P.2d 772, 775 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990). Thus, the "affidavit should be only a starting point, not an end point, in the 
pleading process." Id. 
Also, "in addition to confirming that the defendant understands the elements of the 
crime, the trial court must determine that the defendant 'possesses an understanding of the 
law in relation to the facts' for the defendant's plea to be truly voluntary.'" Thurman, 911 
P.2d at 373. "Rule 11(e) squarely places on trial courts the burden of ensuring that 
constitutional and Rule 11(e) requirements are complied with when a guilty plea is 
entered." State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1312 (Utah 1987). 
The plain error exception to the general preservation rule "enables the appellate 
court to 'balance the need for procedural regularity with the demands of fairness.'" State 
v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, U 13, 10 P.3d 346(quoting State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 122 
n.12 (Utah 1989)). "To demonstrate plain error, a defendant must establish that '(i) an 
error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is 
harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
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outcome for the appellant.'" Larsen, 2005 UT App 2014 3 (quoting Dean, 2004 UT 
63,^ j 15)(other citations omitted). In cases such as this one, where the facts do not 
support the forgery charge of which Mr. Tenorio pled guilty at the advice of his attorney 
and that same attorney represented him until sentencing and the trial court accepted such 
plea, review under plain error is necessary in the interests of justice and fundamental 
fairness. "At bottom, the plain error rule's purpose is to permit [Utah courts] to avoid 
injustice." Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at 1f 13(citations omitted) 
The trial court neither strictly complied with the mandates of R 
Rule 11 personally on the record nor through the plea affidavit because the state 
presented insufficient facts to support the charge of forgery. Rule 11 requires the trial 
court to personally establish on the record that "the defendant understands the nature and 
elements of the offense to which the plea is entered" and that "there is a factual basis for 
the plea." Utah R. Crim. P 11. In order to establish a forgery charge, the state was 
required to prove: 
(2) A person is guilty of forgery, if with purpose to defraud anyone, or with 
knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he: 
(a) alters any writing of another without his authority or utters any such altered 
writing; or 
(b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, transfers, publishes, or 
utters any writing so that the writing or the making, completion, execution, 
authentication, issuance, transference, publication or utterance purports to 
be the act of another, whether the person is existent or nonexistent, or 
purports to have been executed at a time or place or in a numbered 
sequence other than was in fact the case, or to be a copy of an original when 
so such original existed. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-50 l(1999)(emphasis added). In addition, Utah case law 
construing this statute, establishes that one cannot be convicted of forgery if he or she 
signs the relevant document with his or her own name and is not purporting to be another 
person with the same name. See State v. Jensen, 2004 UT App 467. 
Rule 11 states that a "factual basis is sufficient if it establishes that the charged 
crime was actually committed by the defendant or, if the defendant refuses or is 
otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the prosecution has sufficient evidence to 
establish a substantial risk of conviction." In this case there was neither proof that the 
defendant actually committed forgery, nor did the state have sufficient evidence to 
establish a substantial risk of conviction of forgery. 
The trial court explained the elements to Mr. Tenorio at the plea hearing as 
follows: 
By your plea - and let me just get to the information here - by your plea, you 
would be admitting that beginning on or about January of 1999 in Salt Lake 
County you devised a scheme to defraud AccuBank Mortgage Corporation and the 
Federal Housing Administration or to obtain from them money, property, or 
anything else of value by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, 
promises, or material omissions. And you communicated directly or indirectly 
with other people in order to execute or conceal the scheme. What's more, in 
connection with the scheme, you obtained property that was worth more than $ 
5,000. 
You're also admitting that on or about January 1999 in Salt Lake County, with a 
purpose to defraud or understanding and knowledge that you were facilitating a 
fraud, you made or uttered a writing that purported to be the act of somebody else. 
Id. at 27(emphasis added). While the trial court attempted to explain the facts in relation 
to the elements of the communications fraud, it did not attempt the same thing for the 
forgery charge. This is salient because the facts simply did not support the elements of 
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forgery, but the topic is glossed over at every stage of the criminal proceedings against 
Mr. Tenorio. Mr. Tenorio was always told that he "forged" the social security card by his 
own attorney, by the state, and by the trial court. There was no explanation of how the 
specific facts of his case supported forgery. At the plea hearing the trial court attempted 
to establish a factual basis for the forgery as follows: 
Trial Court: Whose social security card is he using? 
State: Your Honor, it belongs to an individual back in New York who passed 
away in the year 2001. I can give you the exact name (inaudible). 
Trial Court: Okay. So basically he obtained illegally information about, private facts 
about an individual and used those numbers and that information to adopt 
that individual's identity? 
State: Yes, your honor. I think what actually happened is upon arriving in this 
country he purchased a social security number off the streets and received a 
social security card that he then used to obtain employment and 
subsequently -
Trial Court: Using his own name but this fake social security number, this other 
person's, deceased person's social security number. 
State: At that point in time the person was still alive I guess, since deceased. In 
1999 he used that number which is the basis of this charge. He presented a 
forged social security card and represented that number to be his own in 
order to obtain a HUD guaranteed loan for a house which he subsequently 
defaulted on. After that in 2001, the actual owner of that number did pass 
away. 
Id. at 22. 
Any time the state attempted to establish the forgery elements with facts, it merely 
stated the social security card was forged without establishing the facts necessary to 
support that statement. For instance, the state explained the forgery charge as follows: 
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"[i]n 1999 he used that number which is the basis of this charge. He presented a forged 
social security card and represented that number to be his own in order to obtain a HUD 
guaranteed loan for a house which he subsequently defaulted on." Id. 
Similarly, later the state attempted to establish facts necessary to support the guilty 
plea, but it never explained the forgery charge, rather it merely assumed all elements 
were present: 
What the State's evidence would have shown is that in 1999 the defendant 
presented a forged social security card, one that had not been issued to him with a 
fake number on it in order to obtain a loan. He presented that to a mortgage loan 
officer essentially with the representation that he was here legally by presenting 
that card. Relying upon that representation, the mortgage loan officer then 
prepared a loan packet for him and submitted that. The loan packet included that 
social security number within it and the defendant signed indicating it was indeed 
his social security number. -
Id. at 28-29. 
The trial court found on this basis "[a] 11 right. Those facts support the plea that 
has been entered. Accordingly I'm going to accept this plea as a knowing and voluntary 
plea." Id. This is critical because if the state attempted or the trial court required a 
factual basis for the guilty plea to forgery, it would have been impossible to establish 
because Mr. Tenorio signed his own name to the social security card. Thus, while his 
actions may have supported some other charge, they did not support the plain language of 
the forgery statute, nor the established case law as is developed supra. 
Mr. Tenorio does not speak English and all the proceedings were conducted 
through the use of an interpreter. It was imperative that the trial court strictly comply 
with rule 11 to ensure that there was a factual basis for the guilty plea and that Mr. 
Tenorio understood the elements of the charges in relation to those facts. Rather than 
explaining the elements of forgery and establishing a factual basis for a forgery 
conviction, the trial court, the state, and Mr. Tenorio's own attorney simply told him he 
forged a social security card. While the trial court granted Mr. Tenorio extra time to 
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review the plea affidavit with the aid of the interpreter, the plea affidavit similarly failed 
to establish the elements of the forgery charge with a factual basis. 
Utah courts have stated that the sufficient affidavit would contain the following: 
(1) a list of the names and the degrees of the crimes charged; (2) a statement of the 
elements of the offenses; (3) a synopsis of the defendant's acts that establish 
the elements of the crime charged', (4) the allowable punishment for the crimes 
charged and note the possibility of consecutive sentences for multiple crimes; 
(5) the rights waived by the entry of a guilty plea; (6) the details of any plea 
bargain with a disclaimer that any sentencing recommendations may not be 
followed; (7) the defendant's ability to read and understand the English 
language; (8) the defendant's competency; and (9) the absence of any 
inducements to influence the defendant's plea. 
Phams, 798 P.2d at 775(emphasis added). However, the plea affidavit did not enumerate 
the elements of forgery in relation to facts supporting those elements. The plea affidavit 
contained the same language that merely assumed a forgery as the state used: 
I presented a forged social security card to a mortgage lender and represented that 
the number belonged to me to obtain a HUD guaranteed loan in the amount of 
$83,871 to purchase a house. 
R. 161-173; See Plea Affidavit at Addendum C. In addition, the plea affidavit is not 
initialed after each paragraph that explains Mr. Tenorio's rights and it is not completely 
filled out. Thus, the trial court did not personally establish on the record, nor through the 
plea affidavit, that Mr. Tenorio understood the elements of the forgery charge and did not 
ensure that there was a factual basis to support those elements. Utah courts have 
determined that "in addition to confirming that the defendant understands the elements of 
the crime, the trial court must determine that the defendant 'possesses an understanding of 
the law in relation to the facts' for the defendant's plea to be truly voluntary.'" Thurman, 
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911 P.2d at 373 (citation omitted). As such, the trial court erred to strictly comply with 
rule 11 and this Court should reverse and remand in order to allow Mr. Tenorio to 
withdraw his guilty plea. As is established supra the case law on the forgery law was 
long-standing and established in Utah such that the error was obvious and because Mr. 
Tenorio pled guilty to all counts as charged without a factual basis or without the court 
personally ensuring that Mr. Tenorio understood the elements in relation to the facts, and 
because Mr. Tenorio pled guilty to both counts as charged, such error was harmful. 
POINT III. THIS COURT CAN REVIEW MR. TENORIO'S GUILTY PLEA 
CONVICTION FOR PLAIN ERROR, INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE. AND 
EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES. 
To the extent current interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(b) precludes 
review of cases of ineffective assistance of counsel claims, plain error review for Rule 11 
violations, and cases of exceptional circumstances on direct appeal for failure to timely 
move to withdraw the guilty plea, such interpretation violates the Sixth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution which guarantees the right to counsel, violates the due 
process right to a knowing and voluntary plea, prevents Rule 11 protections for 
defendants, and denies the right to a full and fair appeal. This Court has the power to 
reach these issues. The Utah Supreme Court has never held in a case on direct appeal 
from the judgment of conviction that it cannot conduct a plain error review of a guilty 
plea proceeding or assess a guilty plea for ineffective assistance. While the supreme 
court did indicate in dictum in State v. Reyes, 2002 UT 13, 40 P.3d 630 that it lacked 
jurisdiction to address Reyes' challenge to his guilty plea because Reyes did not file a 
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timely motion to withdraw that guilty plea, Reyes was not before the Court on direct 
appeal from the judgment of conviction. 
Instead, Reyes filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Rule 22(e), 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure at some point after judgment was entered. Reyes, 
2002 UT 13, f^ 2. Reyes appealed from a denial of his Rule 22(e) motion and attempted 
to attack his guilty plea even though Rule 22(e) pertains only to a sentence. See Utah R. 
Crim. P. 22; State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856 (Utah 1995)(rule 22(e) does not allow 
appellate courts to consider legality of conviction; review is limited to legality of 
sentence). Because the trial court had jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 22(e) to review the 
sentence only, the supreme court in Reyes likewise had jurisdiction to review only the 
sentencing claim and could not reach the legality of the conviction due to the procedural 
posture of the case. 
Because there was controlling case law that precluded it from reaching the legality 
of the conviction since the case involved an appeal of the denial of a rule 22(e) motion, 
the supreme court stated: 
Reyes nonetheless argues that under State v. Marvin, 964 P.2d 313, 314 (Utah 
1998), we can review a guilty plea, regardless of whether a motion to withdraw the 
plea was filed, if plain error or exceptional circumstances exist. In making this 
argument, Reyes overlooks the fact that we decided Marvin using the pre-
amendment version of section 77-13-6, under which the filing of a motion to 
withdraw a guilty plea was an issue of preservation, not, as is now the case, an 
issue of jurisdiction. Marvin, 964 P.2d at 318. This court may choose to review 
an issue not properly preserved for plain error. See State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, 
1f 11, 10 P.3d 346. It cannot, however, use plain error to reach an issue over which 
it has no jurisdiction. 
Reyes, 2002 UT 13, If 4. 
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Given the procedural posture of Reyes, that is, an appeal from a denial of a Rule 
22(e) motion rather than a direct appeal from the conviction, the supreme court did not 
have jurisdiction to conduct a plain error review of Reyes5 guilty plea. See Brooks, 908 
P.2d at 861 (appellate review of denial of Rule 22(e) motion is limited to review of the 
legality of the sentence; appellate court does not have jurisdiction to review the legality 
of a conviction when defendant appeals from denial of a Rule 22(e) motion); State v. 
Finlayson, 2004 UT 10, H 14, 84 P.3d 1193 (same). Under Rule 22(e) circumstances, as 
the Reyes court pointed out, a motion to withdraw guilty plea would have been required 
and the Court could not use the plain error doctrine to create jurisdiction to conduct 
appellate review over the guilty plea conviction. Because Reyes was not on direct appeal 
from the judgment of conviction, however, it did not hold that when a case is on direct 
appeal from the judgment of conviction the appellate court cannot review the conviction 
for plain error or ineffective assistance, and to the extent the language in Reyes is 
interpreted to preclude review on direct appeal from a conviction, it is dictum. 
Indeed, while an appellate court does not have jurisdiction to review a guilty plea 
conviction for plain error or ineffective assistance when a defendant appeals from the 
denial of a Rule 22(e) motion, it does have jurisdiction to review a conviction when a 
defendant appeals directly from the judgment of conviction. In circumstances where a 
defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction, the appellate court has jurisdiction to 
conduct the appeal pursuant to regular rules of appellate procedure, which should include 
the ability to review the case for plain error or ineffective assistance. Unlike Reyes 
where the appellate court did not have jurisdiction to consider the plea because the 
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defendant was appealing from a denial of a Rule 22(e) motion, in this case where Mr. 
Tenorio appealed directly from his judgment of conviction, this Court has appellate 
jurisdiction to review his conviction for plain error, ineffective assistance, or exceptional 
circumstances. 
Reyes did not address a whole line of cases post-Marvin where the Utah Court of 
Appeals had previously stated the rule in the withdrawal statute was jurisdictional, but 
still allowed for plain error and exceptional circumstances review. See State v. 
Tamawiecki, 2000 UT App 186, Tf 11, 5 P.3d 1222; State v. Ostler, 2000 UT App 28, If 8, 
996 P.2d 1065; State v. Price, 837 P.2d 578, 583-84 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). After the 
decision in Reyes was rendered this Court commented: "[t]he supreme court recently 
eliminated this exception to the jurisdictional rule, [permitting review for the above-
enumerated categories] stating that because the appellant failed to file a motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea, the court lacked jurisdiction to address his challenge to the plea, 
even for plain error." State v. Dean, 2002 UT App 323, If 7, 57 P.3d 1106. To the extent 
Reyes is interpreted to preclude plain error or ineffective assistance review of guilty plea 
convictions on direct appeal, such an interpretation is incorrect since unlike the situation 
in Reyes, an appellate court does have jurisdiction to review a conviction when a 
defendant appeals from the judgment of conviction. 
The supreme court decision in State v. Merrill, 2005 UT 34, ^ 19, 114 P.3d 585 
likewise did not hold that an appellate court that has jurisdiction to review a conviction 
and sentence based on the timely filing of a notice of appeal from the judgment cannot 
use the regular tools of review, including ineffective assistance, plain error, and 
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exceptional circumstances. In fact, the defendant in Merrill did not appeal from the 
judgment of conviction and instead, filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea in the trial 
court several months after his conviction was final. Id. at ^ 9. After the trial court 
dismissed the motion to withdraw his guilty plea because it was not timely, the defendant 
appealed from that dismissal. Id. at ^ 11. Although the supreme court held that the thirty 
day requirement creates a jurisdictional bar for filing a motion to withdraw a guilty plea 
in the trial court, it did not hold that when a defendant directly appeals from a judgment 
of conviction, the appellate court cannot use the regular tools of appellate review in 
reviewing that conviction. 
Indeed, in Merrill the supreme court acknowledged the "imperfect lineage" of the 
dictum in the Reyes decision. See Merrill, 2005 UT 34, ^ 19. However, the Court 
supported Reyes as precedent without analyzing the vulnerability of Reyes as precedent 
because the party in that case did not directly address the underpinnings of Reyes. Id. 
This Court should clarify Reyes to the extent that its dictum has been interpreted to 
prevent direct review in cases that deny a defendant the right to the effective assistance of 
counsel, plain error, and exceptional circumstances review. 
Although the supreme court has never directly held that a Utah appellate court 
cannot review a guilty plea conviction for plain error or ineffective assistance when a 
defendant timely appeals from a judgment of conviction, this Court has held that a guilty 
plea in a case on direct appeal cannot be reviewed for plain error or ineffective assistance 
unless the defendant has filed a timely motion to withdraw the guilty plea in the trial 
court (see e.g. State v. Melo, 2001 UT App 392, 40 P.3d 646 (holding that this court 
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lacked jurisdiction to review guilty plea for ineffective assistance where defendant did 
not file a timely motion to withdraw guilty plea); State v. Wilson, 2002 UT App 360 
(unpublished)(same); State v. King, 2004 UT App 79 (unpublished)(same); State v. 
Dean, 2002 UT App 323, 57 P.3d 1106 (same but additionally holding no plain error 
review exception anymore according to Reyes decision); those holdings should be 
overruled because they deprive a criminal defendant of his Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel, his due process and rule 11 rights as well as his right under the Sixth 
Amendment and article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution to a full and fair appeal. 
The Sixth Amendment provides that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the r ight . . . to have the Assistance of counsel for his defense." U.S. Const, 
amend. VI. Likewise, a defendant has the constitutional right to the assistance of counsel 
at all critical stages of the prosecution." State v. Ford, 793 P.2d 397, 400 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990)(citation omitted). "With respect to this right, '[i]t has long been recognized that 
the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.'" Salt Lake City v. 
Grotepas, 906 P.2d 890, 892 (Utah 1995)(quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 
n. 14, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 1449 n. 14, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970)). 
The right to assistance of counsel is required on direct appeal if a state chooses to 
create appellate review. See Douglas v. People, 372 U.S. 353, 83 S.Ct. 814 (1963). 
Specifically the Utah Constitution provides that in criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall have the right to counsel and "to appeal in all cases." Utah Const, art. I, §12; U.S. 
Const, amend. XIV, § 1 (ensuring due process). In State v. Tuttle, 713 P.2d 703 (Utah 
1985), the Utah Supreme Court stated the right to appeal is essential to a fair proceeding. 
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"Rights guaranteed by our state constitution are to be carefully protected by the courts. 
We will not permit them to be lightly forfeited." Id. at 704. The United States Supreme 
Court states: "[t]he right to the assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments is indispensable to the fair administration of our adversarial 
system of criminal justice." Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 168 (1985). 
Utah courts acknowledge "three instances in which an appellate court may address 
an issue for the first time on appeal: (1) where the appellant establishes that the trial court 
committed 'plain error'; (2) where 'exceptional circumstances' exist; or (3) in some 
situations, where a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is raised on appeal." State 
v. Weaver, 2005 UT 49, ^  18, 122 P.3d 566, 570 (citations omitted). The underpinning 
of all three of these exceptions is to avoid manifest injustice in certain types of cases. See 
Irwin, 924 P.2d at 7. "At bottom, the plain error rule's purpose is to permit [Utah courts] 
to avoid injustice." Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at ^  13. Additionally, "[t]he purpose of rule 11 
is to ensure that defendants know their rights and understand the basic consequences of 
their decision to plead guilty." State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, f^ 9. Thus, these procedural 
protections ensure fairness of the system that comport with the demands of due process. 
Those asking Utah appellate courts to "overturn prior precedent have a substantial 
burden of persuasion." State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 398 (Utah 1994). This burden is 
"mandated by the doctrine of stare decisis." Id. This doctrine is a "cornerstone of the 
Anglo-American jurisprudence that is crucial to the predictability of the law and the 
fairness of adjudication." Id. (citation omitted). Appellate courts will overturn prior 
precedent if the petitioner can show that "the rule was originally erroneous or is no longer 
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sound because of changing conditions and that more good than harm will come by 
departing from precedent." Menzies, 889 P.2d at 399. A rule that practically works to 
deny defendant's constitutionally mandated rights was originally erroneous and should be 
overturned. 
In this case, Mr. Tenorio was represented by the same ineffective counsel who 
advised him to plead guilty to all counts as charged four days prior to trial and at 
sentencing when counsel attempted to withdraw. R.276. In order for Mr. Tenorio to 
comply with the time limit in Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(b), his counsel would have 
had to make a motion to withdraw the guilty plea on the basis of ineffective assistance. 
Utah courts have acknowledged that for this very purpose, review of certain claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel that may be technically precluded under jurisdictional or 
preservation rules, should be allowed on direct review. "The law will not assume that 
counsel has advised his client of his inadequacies or those of his associates." State v. 
Smith, 621 P.2d 697, 699 (Utah 1980). 
The law recognizes that the right to assistance of counsel is necessary for fair 
proceedings against a defendant. The average defendant is not in a position to understand 
the sophisticated intricacies of the law and the criminal justice system to have a fair 
proceeding without the effective assistance of counsel. "The right to counsel is a 
fundamental right of criminal defendants; it assures the fairness, and thus the legitimacy, 
of our adversary process." Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 374, 106 S.Ct. 2574 
(1986)(quoting Gideon v. Wainwright 372 U.S. 335, 344, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 l.ed.2d 799 
(1963)). "[T]he right to the effective assistance of counsel is recognized not for its own 
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sake, but because of the effect it has on the ability of the accused to receive a fair trial." 
U.S. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658, 104 S.Ct. 2039 (1984). "The centrality of the right to 
counsel among the rights accorded a criminal defendant is self-evident: '[o]f all the rights 
that an accused person has, the right to be represented by counsel is by far the most 
pervasive, for it affects his ability to assert any other rights he may have.'" Brescia v. 
New Jersey, 417 U.S. 921, 94 S.Ct. 2630 (1974)(quoting Schaefer, Federalism and State 
Criminal Procedure, 70 Harv.L.Rev. 1, 8 (1956)). As such, "[d]efense counsel has duty 
to bring to bear such skill and knowledge as will render the trial a reliable adversarial 
testing process." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 s.ct. 2052 (1984). 
Because of the importance of these rights, the supreme court has determined that a 
criminal defendant, who has failed to file a timely notice of appeal due to counsel's 
ineffective assistance, may be resentenced in the original trial court so that his right to 
appeal may run from the entry of the new judgment. See State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36, 
37-38 (Utah 1981); Manning v. State, 2004 UT App 87,1f 10, 89 P.3d 196 (stating that if 
a defendant has been denied the right to appeal, Utah law recognizes that "in certain 
limited circumstances a defendant should be resentenced in order to revive [that] right."). 
The basic policy behind courts fashioning exceptions to rules that bar review in these 
type of cases is that courts do not expect that ineffective counsel will advise his client of 
his or her ineffectiveness. See Smith, 621 P.2d at 699. 
Interpreting Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(b) to preclude direct appellate review in 
cases of ineffective assistance of counsel where the same counsel represented defendant 
when he entered his guilty plea and at sentencing denies defendant the right to receive the 
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assistance of counsel at all critical proceedings where the right to counsel is 
constitutionally mandated. While a defendant can seek review based on ineffective 
assistance of counsel under Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 under the Post-Conviction Relief 
Act and Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65C, this does not remedy the constitutional defect 
since the defendant is not entitled to court appointed counsel, bears the burden of proof, 
and is subject to other procedural rules that could preclude review. Likewise, because a 
defendant cannot bring all rule 11 plain error violations in post-conviction relief, that 
claim could also be foreclosed. See Moench v. State, 2004 UT App 57, Tf 17, 88 P.3d 
353 (quoting Salazar v. Warden, 852 P.2d 988, 992 (Utah 1993)). 
As the policy behind the right to the assistance of counsel acknowledges, 
assistance of counsel is essential to fair proceedings against a defendant who is unskilled 
in the nuances of the law. While a trial court may grant assistance of counsel for 
collateral proceedings, appointment of counsel in this context is entirely discretionary and 
cannot cure the denial of assistance of counsel at the plea hearing, sentencing, and direct 
appeal. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752, 111 S.Ct. 2546 (1991)(quoting 
Pennsylvania v.Finlev, 481 U.S. 551, 107 S.Ct. 1990, 95 L.Ed.2d 539 (1987)(other 
citation omitted))( "[t]here is no constitutional right to an attorney in state post-conviction 
proceedings."). Nor is there a constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel in 
post-conviction proceedings. See id. 
Thus, a defendant who was erroneously advised by ineffective counsel to plead 
guilty and is represented by that same counsel at sentencing, is never able to receive 
effective assistance of counsel for redress because the current interpretation of law 
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precludes this issue from direct review. For the same reason this procedural difficulty 
results in a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, it also qualifies as a rare 
procedural anomaly under the exceptional circumstances review courts provide to avoid 
manifest injustice. See State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 7 (Utah Ct. App. 1996)(discussing 
exceptional circumstances doctrine.). 
The bar to review in cases of ineffective assistance, plain error, and exceptional 
circumstances cases when the defendant pled guilty, but can show constitutional error at 
the trial level and did not move to withdraw the guilty plea because of that constitutional 
defect, leaves a defendant without the right and benefit to a full and fair appeal. The 
"Sixth Amendment rights of accused in all criminal prosecutions to . . . have assistance of 
counsel for his defense are part of the 'due process of law' that is guaranteed by 
Fourteenth Amendment to defendants in the criminal courts of state." Faretta v. 
California, 422 U.S. 806, 818, 95 S.Ct. 2525 (1975). 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant/Appellant Robert Osorio Tenorio respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse this case and remand to the trial court to enter. 
SUBMITTED this £ ° day of March, 2006. 
^ . <B>^^^)\JU?^ 
JOSiE E. BRUMFIELD 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
ROBERT OSORIO TENORIO, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 041904383 FS 
Judge: DENISE P LINDBERG 
Date: July 22, 2005 
PRESENT 
Clerk: micheldb 
Prosecutor: HAMP, RICHARD G 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): MCGREGOR GUELKER, MARIANNE 
Interpreter: GLORIA UPDEGROVE 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Language: spanish 
Date of birth: May 6, 1972 
Video 
Tape Number: 7/22/05 Tape Count: 10:20:24 
CHARGES 
1. COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 04/22/2005 Guilty 
2. FORGERY - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 04/22/2005 Guilty 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD a 2nd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 365 day(s) 
The total time suspended for this charge is 365 day(s). 
Restitution Amount: $50817.00 Plus Interest 
Pay in behalf of: HUD 
T5^i<^f<-N "1 
Case No: 041904383 
Date: Jul 22, 2005 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 36 month(s). 
Probation is to be supervised by GOOD BEHAVIOR PROBATION. 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
Violate no laws. 
Submit to deportation or leave the country voluntarily within 10 
days of release. 
Do not re-enter the country illegally. 
3 6 months good behavior probation. 
Defendant to self surrender to ICE by 8/3/05 for deportation. 
Restititon ordered in the amount of $50817. 
Defendant not to remain in the US illegally or not to_re-enter the 
US or Utah illegally. 
Bench warrant to issue on 8/4/05 for $100,000 
Dated this JZ( day of 
DE&IS 
Distric 
Paqe 2 (last) 
3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT OSORIO TENORIO, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 041904383 FS 
Judge: DENISE P LINDBERG 
Date: July 22, 2005 
PRESENT 
Clerk: micheldb 
Prosecutor: HAMP, RICHARD G 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): MCGREGOR GUELKER, MARIANNE 
Interpreter: GLORIA UPDEGROVE 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Language: Spanish 
Date of birth: May 6, 1972 
Video 
T a p e N u m b e r : 7 / 2 2 / 0 5 T a p e C o u n t : 1 0 : 2 0 : 2 4 
CHARGES 
1. COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 04/22/2005 Guilty 
2. FORGERY - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 04/22/2005 Guilty 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD a 2nd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 3 65 day(s) 
The total time suspended for this charge is 365 day(s). 
Based on the defendant's conviction of FORGERY a 3rd Degree Felony, 
the defendant is sentenced to a term of 365 day(s) The total time 
suspended for this charge is 365 day(s). 
Restitution Amount: $50817.00 Plus Interest 
Pay in behalf of: HUD 
p^rr*=> 1 
Case No: 041904383 
Date: Jul 22, 2005 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 36 month(s). 
Probation is to be supervised by GOOD BEHAVIOR PROBATION. 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
Violate no laws. 
Submit to deportation or leave the country voluntarily within 10 
days of release. 
Do not re-enter the country illegally. 
3 6 months good behavior probation. 
Defendant to self surrender to ICE by 8/3/05 for deportation. 
Restititon ordered in the amount of $50817. 
Defendant not to remain in the US illegally or not to re-enter the 
US or Utah illegally. 
Bench warrant to issue on 8/4/05 for $100,000 if the defendant 
fails to self report. 
Dated this day of , 20 . 
DENISE P LINDBERG 
District Court Judge 
-r^^^ o M r a o ^ 
ADDENDUM B 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-303 
76-1-303, Time limitations for fraud or breach of fiduciary obligation — 
Misconduct of public officer or employee. 
(1) If the period prescribed in Section 76-1-302 has expired, a prosecution may 
be commenced for any offense a material element of which is either fraud or a 
breach of fiduciary obligation within one year after discovery of the offense by an 
aggrieved party or by a person who has a legal duty to represent an aggrieved 
party and who is himself not a party to the offense. 
(2) Subsection (1) may not extend the period of limitation as provided in 
Section 76-1-302 by more than three years. 
(3) If the period prescribed in Section 76-1-301.5 or 76-1-302 has expired, a 
prosecution may be commenced for: 
(a) any offense based upon misconduct in office by a public officer or public 
employee: 
(i) at any time during which the defendant holds a public office or during the 
period of his public employment; or 
(ii) within two years after termination of defendant's public office or public 
employment. 
(b) Except as provided in Section 76-1-301.5, Subsection (3) shall not extend 
the period of limitation otherwise applicable by more than three years. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-501 
76-6-501. Forgery - "Writing" defined. 
(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud anyone, or with 
knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he: 
(a) alters any writing of another without his authority or utters any such altered 
writing; or 
(b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, transfers, publishes, or 
utters any writing so that the writing or the making, completion, execution, 
authentication, issuance, transference, publication or utterance purports to be the 
act of another, whether the person is existent or nonexistent, or purports to have 
been executed at a time or place or in a numbered sequence other than was in fact 
the case, or to be a copy of an original when no such original existed. 
(2) As used in this section, "writing" includes printing, electronic storage or 
transmission, or any other method of recording valuable information including 
forms such as: 
(a) checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges, trademarks, money, and 
any other symbols of value, right, privilege, or identification; 
(b) a security, revenue stamp, or any other instrument or writing issued by a 
government or any agency; or 
(c) a check, an issue of stocks, bonds, or any other instrument or writing 
representing an interest in or claim against property, or a pecuniary interest in or 
claim against any person or enterprise. 
(3) Forgery is a felony of the third degree. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1801 
76-10-1801. Communications fraud — Elements — Penalties. 
(1) Any person who has devised any scheme or artifice to defraud another or to 
obtain from another money, property, or anything of value by means of false or 
fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who 
communicates directly or indirectly with any person by any means for the purpose 
of executing or concealing the scheme or artifice is guilty of: 
(a) a class B misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or thing 
obtained or sought to be obtained is less than $300; 
(b) a class A misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or thing 
obtained or sought to be obtained is or exceeds $300 but is less than $1,000; 
(c) a third degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing 
obtained or sought to be obtained is or exceeds $1,000 but is less than $5,000; 
(d) a second degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing 
obtained or sought to be obtained is or exceeds $5,000; and 
(e) a second degree felony when the object of the scheme or artifice to defraud 
is other than the obtaining of something of monetary value. 
(2) The determination of the degree of any offense under Subsection (1) shall 
be measured by the total value of all property, money, or things obtained or sought 
to be obtained by the scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) except as 
provided in Subsection (l)(e). 
(3) Reliance on the part of any person is not a necessary element of the offense 
described in Subsection (1). 
(4) An intent on the part of the perpetrator of any offense described in 
Subsection (1) to permanently deprive any person of property, money, or thing of 
value is not a necessary element of the offense. 
(5) Each separate communication made for the purpose of executing or 
concealing a scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) is a separate act and 
offense of communication fraud. 
(6) (a) To communicate as described in Subsection (1) means to bestow, 
convey, make known, recount, impart; to give by way of information; to talk over; 
or to transmit information. 
(b) Means of communication include but are not limited to use of the mail, 
telephone, telegraph, radio, television, newspaper, computer, and spoken and 
written communication. 
(7) A person may not be convicted under this section unless the pretenses, 
representations, promises, or material omissions made or omitted were made or 
omitted intentionally, knowingly, or with a reckless disregard for the truth. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-13-6 
77-13-6. Withdrawal of plea. 
(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction. 
(2) (a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon leave of the 
court and a showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made. 
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest, except for a plea held 
in abeyance, shall be made by motion before sentence is announced. Sentence may 
not be announced unless the motion is denied. For a plea held in abeyance, a 
motion to withdraw the plea shall be made within 30 days of pleading guilty or no 
contest. 
(c) Any challenge to a guilty plea not made within the time period specified in 
Subsection (2)(b) shall be pursued under Title 78, Chapter 35a, Post-Conviction 
Remedies Act, and Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
ADDENDUM C 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
EN LA CORTE DEL TERCER DISTRITO JUDICIAL 
CONDADO DE LAGO SALADO, ESTADO DE UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
ESTADO DE UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
Parte Acusadora, 
STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT 
IN SUPPORT OF GUILTY PLEA 
AND CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL 
AFIRMACION DEL ACUSADO EN 
APOYO DE LA DECLARACION DE 
CULPABILIDAD Y CERTIFICADO 
DEL ASESOR JURIDICO 
vs. 
contra 
R P W A Ofx>r\G ~XeM.or\n 
Case No. : 
Numero del caso: 
Defendant. 
Acusado. 
Judge: Denise Posse Lindberg 
Juez: 
I, _, hereby acknowledge and certify that I have been 
advised of and that I understand the following facts and nghts: 
Yo5 , por medio de la presente reconozco y 
certifico que se me ha informado de los siguientes hechos y derechos y que los 
entiendo. 
Notification of Charges 
Notification de Cargos 
I am pleading guilty (or no contest) to the following crimes: 
Me declaro culpable (o sin disputa) de los siguientes delitos: 
1 
The elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest) are: 
_Los elementos del (de los) delito(s) del (de los) cual(es) me declaro culpable (o sin 
disputa) son los siguientes: 
_J£ •77r-^*<~t-t^ ^ y^^c^y <&*4^ *>S^^*C s-rt^J? 
zr tffv t^f/^ fa^ w*^* 
I understand that by pleading guilty I will be admitting that I committed the crimes 
listed above. (Or, if I am pleading no contest, I am not contesting that I committed the 
foregoing crimes). I stipulate and agree (or, if I am pleading no contest, I do not dispute or 
contest) that the following facts describe my conduct and the conduct of other persons for 
which I am criminally liable. These facts provide a basis for the court to accept my guilty 
(or no contest) pleas and prove the elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty 
(or no contest): 
Entiendo que al declararme culpable, estare admitiendo que cometi los delitos 
citados anteriormente. (O si me declaro sin disputa, que no disputo que haya cometido 
susodichos delitos). Estipulo y estoy de acuerdo (o si me declaro sin disputa, no 
disputo ni recuso) que los siguientes hechos describen mi conducta y la conducta de 
otras personas por las cuales tengo responsabilidad penal. Estos hechos proveen el 
fundamento para que la corte acepte mis declaraciones de culpabilidad (o sin disputa) 
y comprueban los elementos del (del los) delito(s) por el (los) cual(es) me declaro 
culpable (o sin disputa): 
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If I have waived my right to counsel, I certify that I have read this statement and that 
I understand the nature and elements of the charges and crimes to which I am pleading guilty 
(or no contest). I also understand my rights in this case and other cases and the 
consequences of my guilty (or no contest) plea(s). 
Si he renunciado a mi derecho a asesoria, certifico que he leido esta afirmacion 
y que entiendo la naturaleza y los elementos de las acusaciones y de los delitos de los 
cuales me declaro culpable (o sin disputa). Tambien entiendo mis derechos en este caso 
y en otros casos y las consecuencias de mi(s) declaracion(es) de culpabilidad (o sin 
disputa). 
If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is . 
My attorney and I have fully discussed this statement, my rights, and the consequences of 
my guilty (or no contest) plea(s). 
Si no he renunciado a mi derecho a asesoria, mi abogado(a) es . 
Mi abogado(a) y yo hemos hablado a fondo sobre esta afirmacion, mis derechos y las 
consecuencias de mi(s) declaracion(es) de culpabilidad (o sin disputa). 
Jury Trial. I know that I have a right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial 
(unbiased) jury and that I will be giving up that right by pleading guilty (or no contest). 
Juicio por Jurado. Se que tengo el derecho a un juicio publico y sin demora ante 
un jurado imparcial (sin prejuicio) y que al declararme culpable (o sin disputa) 
renuncio a ese derecho. 
Confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses. I know that if I were to have 
a jury trial, a) I would have the right to see and observe the witnesses who testified against 
me and b) my attorney, or myself if I waived my right to an attorney, would have the 
opportunity to cross-examine all of the witnesses who testified against me. 
Careo y contrainterrogatorio de testigos. Se que si tuviera un juicio'por jurado: 
a) tendria el derecho de ver y observar a los testigos que testificaran en contra de mi 
y b) mi abogado o yo, si renunciara al derecho de tener abogado, tendriamos la 
oportunidad de contrainterrogar a todos los testigos que testificaran en contra di mi. 
Right to compel witnesses. I know that if I were to have a jury trial, I could call 
witnesses if I chose to, and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance and 
testimony of those witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to appear, the 
State would pay those costs. 
5 Iwy 
Appeal. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury or 
judge, 1 would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford the 
costs of an appeal, the State would pay those costs for me. I understand that I am giving up 
my right to appeal my conviction if I plead guilt)' (or no contest). I understand that if I wish 
to appeal mv sentence I must file a notice of appeal within 30 days after mv sentence is 
entered. 
Recurso de Apelacion. Se que bajo la Constitution de Utah, si un jurado o un 
juez me condenara, tendrfa el derecho de apelar mi condena y el castigo. Si yo no 
pudiera costear los gastos de una apelacion el Estado me los pagaria. Si me declaro 
culpable (o sin disputa) entiendo que estoy renunciando al derecho de apelar mi 
condena. Entiendo que si deseo apelar mi condena, tendria que levantar notification 
de la apelacion dentro de los 30 dias despues que se haya asentado mi condena. 
I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up all 
the statutory and constitutional rights as explained above. 
Se y entiendo que al declararme culpable abandono y renuncio a todos los 
derechos estatutarios v constitucionales explicados anteriormente. 
Consequences of Entering a Guilty (or No Contest) Plea 
Consecuencias de Presentar una Declaracion de Culpablilidad (o Sin Disputa) 
Potential penalties. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each 
crime to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest). I know that by pleading guilty (or no 
contest) to a crime that carries a mandatory penalty, I will be subjecting myself to serving 
a mandatory penalty for that crime. I know my sentence may include a prison term, fine, or 
both. 
Penas potenciales. Se cual es la sentencia maxima que se me podria imponer por 
cada delito del cual me declare culpable (o sin disputa). Al declararme culpable (o sin 
disputa) de un delito queconlleva una condena obligatoria, seque me someto a cumplir 
con la condena obligatoria de ese delito. Se que puede que mi condena incluya un 
periodo de prision, una multa, o ambos, 
I know that in addition to a fine, an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge will be 
imposed. I also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of my 
7 
Translation Approved by Administrative Office of the Courts 
declarators negociado, si hubiera alguna, se encuentran en su totalidad en esta 
afirmacion, incluso las que se explican a continuation: 
#?>A" *%&*- b*-^*S ts#**— • ^ ^ ^ '/*?• >rs0t>&-
^ g > -f£+U- U^tlj' UoJ—<fh£c JCfU^/sA, ftu^-J* j£*r* 
£j0 3fr*£ 
Trial judge not bound, I know that any charge or sentencing concession or 
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges 
for sentencing, made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not 
binding on the judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what they 
believe the judge may do are not binding on the judge. 
_E1 juez de primera instancia no esta obligado. Se que el juez no esta obligado 
a aceptar ninguna acusacion, concesion condenatoria, recomendacion de libertad 
condicional, condena suspendida o incluso la reduction de los cargos cuando se 
imponga la condena, aunque estas hayan sido presentadas o soiicitadas por el asesor 
juridico defensor o el abogado acusador. Se tambien que el juez no esta obligado a 
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I am years of age. I have attended school through the grade. I can read 
and understand the English language. If I do not understand English, an interpreter has been 
provided to me. I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication, or intoxicants 
which would impair my judgment when I decided to plead guilty. I am not presently under 
the influence of any drug, medication, or intoxicants which impair my judgment. 
Tengo anos de edad. He asistido a la escuela hasta el aiio. 
Puedo leer y entender el idioma ingles. Si no entiendo el ingles se me ha facilitado un 
interprete. No estaba bajo la influencia de ninguna droga, medicamento o 
estupefaciente que pudiera perjudicar mi juicio cuando decidi declararme culpable. 
En este momento no me encuentro bajo la influencia de ninguna droga, medicamento 
o estupefaciente que podria perjudicar mi juicio. 
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally capable of 
understanding these proceedings and the consequences of my plea. I am free of any mental 
disease, defect, or impairment that would prevent me from understanding what I am doing 
or from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering my plea. 
Considero que estoy en pleno uso de mis facultades y de mi capacidad mental 
para comprender estos procesos y las consecuencias de mi declaracion. No padezco de 
ningiin trastorno, defecto o deterioro mental que me impediria comprender lo que 
estoy haciendo o presentar mi declaracion consciente, inteligente y voluntariamente. 
I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty (or no contest) plea(s), I must 
file a written motion to withdraw my plea(s) before sentence is announced. I 
understand that for a plea held in abeyance, a motion to withdraw from the plea 
agreement must be made within 30 days of pleading guilty or no contest. I will only 
be allowed to withdraw my plea if I show that it was not knowingly and voluntarily 
made. I understand that any challenge to my plea(s) made after sentencing must be 
pursued under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act in Title 78, Chapter 35a and Rule 
65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Entiendo que si deseo retirar rni(s) declaracionfes) de culpabilidad (o de no 
disputar) debo Ievantar un pedimento escrito para retirar mi(s) declaracion(es) antes 
que se pronuncie la condena. Entiendo que para una declaracion mantenida en 
suspenso, habria que Ievantar un pedimento para retirar el convenio declaratorio 
dentro de los 30 dias despues de haberme declarado culpable o sin disputa. Solo se me 
permitiria retirar mi declaracion si demostrara que no se presento la declaracion 
consciente v voluntariamente. Entiendo que si hubiera alguna recusacion a mi(s) 
declaracionfes) que se levantara despues de la imposicion de la condena. habria que 
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T ~ rl„t „ , Jrs,~>,nuod h\i j4rfmmi*lititivt> Office of(ll€ Courts 
Certificate of Prosecuting Attorney 
Certificado del Asesor Juridico Acusador 
/*) * / * certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against 
t/fj M^TJ ^S^'ftf-*- ^ 4 ^ ^ T ~ : defendant. I have reviewed this Statement 
of Defendant and find that the factual basis of the defendant's criminal conduct which 
constitutes the offense(s) is true and correct. No improper inducements, threats, or coercion 
to encourage a plea has been offered defendant. The plea negotiations are fully contained 
in the Statement and in the attached Plea Agreement or as supplemented on the record before 
the Court,„ There is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence would support the 
conviction of defendant for the offense(s) for which the plea(s) is/are entered and that the 
acceptance of the plea(s) would serve the public interest; 
Certifico que soy el asesor juridico del Estado de Utah en el caso contra 
__, el acusado* He revisado esta Afirmacion del 
Acusadc) y Incuentro que el fundamento de hechps de la conducta delictiva del acusado 
que constitute el (lbs) delito(s) es fiel y correcta. Al acusado no se le ha ofrecido 
ningiin incentivo, amehaza ni coaccion indebido para instarle a presentar la 
declaracioh. Las negociaciories dfeclaratorias figuran en su totalidad en la Afirmacion 
y en el Convenio Declaratorio adjunio, <6 segun se ha suplido en ej acta ante la Corte. 
Existen causas razonables para creer que las pruebas apoyarian la condena del 
acusado del(de los) delito(s) por el(los) cual(es) la(s) declafaci6n(es) esta(estan) 
presentada(s) y que la aceptacion de la(s) declaracion(es) serviria al iriteres publico. 
ROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
ASESOR JURIDICO ACUSADOR 
Bar No. V ^ ^ 
^'
:
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH - APRIL 22, 2005 
JUDGE DENISE P. LINDBERG PRESIDING 
For the Plaintiff: RICHARD G. HAMP 
For the Defendant: MARIANNE MCGREGOR GUELKER 
Interpreter: ? 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: We are set on a final pretrial 
erence and I am told that the parties have reached a plea 
~~t-i 
MS. GUELKER: Yes, Your Honor. 
MR. HAMP: Your Honor, the State anticipates the 
ndant will be entering guilty pleas to Count 1, the 
cations fraud alternative, the second degree felony 
unt"' 2, the third degree forgery count. We also have 
lings-:, we have offered in order to reduce that plea. 
^ ;• have, offered is contained in the statement of the 
mt and I'll briefly (inaudible) that, mention those. 
''- the State will not pursue additional charges for 
Code violations. The second is is that the State 
^ pursue additional charges arising from identity 
forgery charges which would arise from the 
'^continued employment at Siegfried's Delicatessen 
al security number that does not belong to him up 
sentencing. The purpose for that particular 
-nation is the defendant would like to remain employed 
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in order to save up money to aid him in his trip back to 
Mexico which is what we anticipate will happen. 
The third thing the State is willing to do is 
recommend as a sentencing recommendation that the defendant 
receive a suspended jail and/or prison sentence in lieu of 
deportation. 
The fourth thing the State is going to recommend is 
the defendant pay restitution in the form of receiving a 
civil judgment in the amount of restitution which I've set 
forth and it's $50,000. 
THE COURT: $50,000? 
MR. HAMP: I can give you the exact figure, Your 
Honor. $50,817 which would be in the favor of Housing and 
Urban Development and — 
THE COURT: The Federal Department of Housing and 
Urban Development? 
MR. HAMP: That's correct. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. HAMP: Is there something I'm leaving out? 
MS. GUELKER: Did you say the part about the 
concurrent sentences? 
MR. HAMP: Your Honor, that is correct. The other 
thing is we're going to recommend that he be sentenced 
concurrently. 



















r you need to understand is that any negotiations between 
+
 counsel m terms of recommendations that would be made are 
* only advisory to the Court. That means that I am not bound 
to follow them and I may very well disagree once I know more 
about these facts* So, you need to understand that the 
recommendations are just that. They're recommendations and 
I'm not bound by them. 
MS. GUELKER: Your Honor, also may (inaudible) 
theft by deception? 
MR. HAMP: I clarified the record. Essentially, 
the State's intent is to not pursue any charges that may 
arise from his continued use of that social security number 
to gain employment at Siegfried's Deli. We don't want to 
make it any broader than that, up until the point in time 
that he is deported assuming that would evolve if the Court 
opposes that type of sentence, that would be obvious. If for 
some reason he remained in this country, we will not make any 
carte blanche permission for him to commit identity fraud for 
all intense and purposes. 
THE COURT: Whose social security card is he using? 
MR. HAMP: Your Honor, it belongs to an individual 
back in New York who passed away in the year 2001. I can 
give you the exact name (inaudible). 
THE COURT: Okay. So basically he obtained 
illegally information about, private facts about an 
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individual and used those numbers and that information to 
adopt that individual's identity? 
MR. HAMP: Yes, Your Honor. I think what actually 
happened is upon arriving in this country he purchased a 
social security number off the streets and received a social 
security card that he then used to obtain employment and 
subsequently — 
THE COURT: Using his own name but this fake social 
security number, this other person's, deceased person's 
social security number? 
MR. HAMP: At that point in time the person was 
still alive I guess, since deceased. In 1999 he used that 
number which is the basis of this charge. He presented a 
forged social security card and represented that number to be 
his own in order to obtain a HUD guaranteed loan for a house 
which he subsequently defaulted on. After that in 2001, the 
actual owner of that number did pass away. 
MS. GUELKER: Your Honor, I'm going to say he's 
been at the same job for nine years. The house in question 
was an error in judgment and part of a mortgage scheme that I 
think about 200 persons were — 
THE COURT: I don't find that particularly 
commendable or assisting in his — 
MS. GUELKER: He's a hard working person. He is 
going to be deported I think regardless of what sentence you 
i choose to propose. Were we to argue this, we would argue 
2 that he lacked the intent to cause this and did not 
3 intentionally default on a house. He lived there for a year 
4 and made various improvements. It happened to many people 
5 unfortunately, could not — 
g THE COURT: The issue is not that he intended to 
7 default on the house. The issue is that he intended to and 
8 in fact did use information that didn't belong to him to 
9 secure a loan in which he then was unable to maintain, right? 
10 MS. GUELKER: Well, obviously we would phrase it 
11 differently but not being able to be in this country any 
12 more, I have advised him of the consequences of coming back 
L3 to this country after deportation is fatal. Not only would 
14 he be forced to serve out whatever sentence he would have 
15 remaining on these charges but then of course he would be in 
16 serious trouble with the United States and would face 
17 consequences separate from these charges here. He's been in 
18 this country working hard, does not have a criminal record. 
19 He basically is here working and lacked the intent to 
20 defraud. He was a — 
21 I THE COURT: Well, if he lacked the intent to 
defraud, why are we pleading? Why aren't we going to trial 
and Mr. Tenorio is set for trial on Tuesday and he has the 

























MS. GUELKER: Well, that is true. Forgive me Your 
Honor, are you asking me to - I know that my client if he 
pleads guilty needs to make a statement to the Court about 
what he is pleading guilty to. 
THE COURT: Correct. 
MS. GUELKER: We can do that. 
THE COURT: First of all, let me talk with Mr. 
Tenorio, Osorio actually, right? 
MS. GUELKER: Osorio Tenorio. 
THE COURT: Mr. Osorio, do you understand that you 
are set for trial this coming Tuesday and you would have the 
right to a speedy trial with an impartial jury? You would 
have the right at trial to be represented by counsel. It 
would be the State's burden to prove you guilty of these 
charges beyond a reasonable doubt and you would be presumed 
innocent and the jury would be instructed that they must 
begin the trial with that presumption. 
At trial, you would have the right to confront and 
cross examine witnesses against you, subpoena your own 
witnesses to appear and testify and if a jury convicted you, 
you would have a right to appeal. Now, by entering this 
plea, you would be giving up many of those rights, most of 
those rights and you would be severely limiting your appeal 
rights. Now those rights are explained in more detail in 
that yellow document that your attorney has there that is 
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¥written in both English and Spanish. Did you have a chance 
u±o read it or review it with you attorney? Senior Onsorio? 
fa*- ** 
1 MR. TENORIO (through interpreter): (Inaudible) 
because of my nerves. 
u 
THE COURT: Do you want to have some additional 
time to review what's in there because you are certainly 
entitled to it. I've told you in summary what it says but 
you have the right to take a little bit longer and read it 
and make sure you understand and fully comprehend all the 
rights that you are giving up by entering this plea. 
MR. TENORIO (through interpreter): Well, 
[unintelligible]. 
THE COURT: That may be the case but the issue is 
that before I can accept your plea, I need to be sure that 
you understand what are the rights that you are giving up by 
accepting this plea. So it's important because I cannot by 
law accept your plea unless I am convinced that you 
thoroughly understand what you're giving up and that you' re 
entering this plea voluntarily. So why don't you take five 
minutes, sit down. You can sit down with the interpreter if 
you need some assistance and then I'd like you to review that 
document. 
MS. GUELKER: We will do that, Your Honor. 
(Whereupon a recess was taken) 
THE COURT: Have you had time now to review that 
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document, the plea form and did you understand everything 
that was covered in there? 
MR. TENORIO (through interpreter): Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. And you understand - let me 
make sure Mr. Hamp. He's pleading to Counts 1 and 3? 
MR. HAMP: Yes. 
THE COURT: And you're dismissing Count 2? 
MR. HAMP: There really isn't a Count 2. He's 
pleading to 1 and 2 the alternative — 
THE COURT: These are his alternatives. I'm sorry. 
We were showing them as three counts. Okay. 
MR. HAMP: My apologies, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: No, that's okay. It's the way it was 
entered in our computer. So it's count 1, count 2 was an 
alternative. So he's pleading to it as communications fraud, 
not as theft by deception? 
MR. HAMP: That is correct, Your Honor. And Count 
2 is the forgery. 
THE COURT: Okay. These counts carry with them 
maximum penalties of 1 to 15 year at the state prison with 
respect to Count 1 and a fine of $10,000 plus an 85 percent 
surcharge and a security fee. Count 2, the forgery, is a 
third degree felony that can serve a maximum penalty of 0 to 
5 years at the state prison and a fine of $5,000 plus an 85 
percent surcharge and a security fee. 
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By your plea - and let me just get to the 
information here - by your plea, you would be admitting that 
beginning on or about January of 1999 in Salt Lake County you 
devised a scheme to defraud AccuBank Mortgage Corporation and 
the Federal Housing Administration or to obtain from them 
money, property, or anything else of value by means of false 
or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or 
material omissions. And you communicated directly or 
indirectly with other people in order to execute or conceal 
the scheme. What's more, in connection with the scheme, you 
obtained property that was worth more than $5,000. 
You're also admitting that on or about January 1999 
in Salt Lake County, with a purpose to defraud or 
understanding and knowledge that you were facilitating a 
fraud, you made or uttered a writing that purported to be the 
act of somebody else. Do you understand that those are the 
things you would be admitting? 
MR. TENORIO (through interpreter): Yes. 
THE COURT: Have you been promised anything other 
than what Mr. Hamp has put on the record in order to get you 
to enter this plea? 
MR. TENORIO (through interpreter): No. 
THE COURT: Is anybody forcing you into entering 
this plea? 
MR. TENORIO (through interpreter): No. 
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THE COURT: Have you had sufficient time to discuss 
this plea with your attorney? 
MR. TENORIO (through interpreter): Yes. 
THE COURT: Are you satisfied with the advice you 
received? 
MR. TENORIO (through interpreter): Yes. 
THE COURT: Are you today under the influence of 
alcohol, any drug, anything else that would effect your 
ability to enter this plea? 
MR. TENORIO (through interpreter): No. 
THE COURT: I think I may have asked this already 
but is anybody forcing you into doing this? 
MR. TENORIO (through interpreter): No. 
THE COURT: All right Mr. Osorio, with all that 
information, do you still want to proceed and enter your plea 
today to these charges? 
MR. TENORIO (through interpreter): Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. If you would then go ahead 
and sign the plea form, we'll incorporate that into the 
record. 
First of all, I need to have Mr. Hamp add whatever 
additional facts are necessary to support the plea? 
MR. HAMP: Your Honor, yes. What the State's 
evidence would have shown is that in 1999 the defendant 
presented a forged social security card, one that had not 
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been issued to him with a fake number on it in order to 
obtain a loan. He presented that to a mortgage loan officer 
essentially with the representation that he was here legally 
by presenting that card. Relying upon that representation, 
the mortgage loan officer then prepared a loan packet for him 
and submitted that. The loan packet included that social 
security number within it and the defendant signed indicating 
it was indeed his social security number. That loan went 
through the process for approximately two months during which 
the defendant provided additional information like where he 
worked. That information also contained the social security 
number on it. At the end of that period if then went to a 
closing where again the defendant represented that that was 
his social security number and the loan was closed. The 
mortgage officer nor the title officer would have proceeded 
with any of it if they had known that that wasn't his social 
security number and the loan would not have closed. The loan 
was closed, he received a loan in the amount of $80,000 some 
odd which was HUD guaranteed. He paid on that loan for a 
period of time, I think it was approximately two years, I'm 
not positive. At that time the loan went into default and 
the house was foreclosed and HUD honored their guaranteed and 
paid out approximately $50,000 some odd which we have 
specified the exact amount in the plea agreement. That would 
be the State's evidence. 
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THE COURT: All right. Those facts support the 
that has been entered. Accordingly I'm going to accept 
?his pl^a a s a knowing and voluntary plea. Any attempt to 
Withdraw this plea would have to be done in writing for good 
It 
feause. That is, you would have to give me a very good reason 
why I should do it and needs to be made before you are 
I 
sentenced. As of the time of sentencing, your ability to 
Withdraw the plea terminates and that is jurisdictional bar. 
What are we contemplating here? Are we 
anticipating - well, let me hear* 
MR. HAMP: Your Honor, it was going to be the 
State's suggestion that we set sentencing downstream. I was 
going to suggest a 30-day period. I don't know if the pre-
sentence report would necessarily give us much more 
information than what we currently have; however, there are a 
number of arrangements the defendant wanted to make in 
anticipation that [unintelligible] and we certainly don't 
mind giving him that time to do that. 
THE COURT: Why don't we set this for sentencing on 
June 3rd because otherwise I'm going to be out of the country 
and not back until July 1. June 3rd then at 9:00 in the 
morning. I will see you then. 
Yes, you will have the time to talk to me at the 
time of sentencing. Is there something you want to say to me 
now? 
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MR. TENORIO (through interpreter): Yes. 
(Inaudible) the house. 
THE COURT: About what? 
MR. TENORIO: (through interpreter): (inaudible) 
house. 
THE COURT: I think your attorney would prefer that 
you speak at the time of sentencing. 
MR. TENORIO (through interpreter): Well yes, 
[unintelligible] same. 
THE COURT: Okay, I will see you on June 3. Thank 
you. 
(Whereupon the hearing was concluded) 
